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Abstract 
The loyalist political majority in New Caledonia is a group which has been 
largely neglected by academics and the media. Collectively, this majority has been 
attributed the status of a distinct community under the title "Caldochie". "Caldochie"- a 
state of mind? examines the diverse ethnic and social groups who support New 
Caledonia's continued status as an Overseas Territory within the French Republic. 
Chapter One discusses the various ethnic and social groups who support 
continued ties with France. Central to these groups are the Caldoches, inhabitants of 
European descent considered to be assimilated into the Territory. The presence of 
metropolitan French citizens in New Caledonia is also examined. As well as Europeans, 
other ethnic groups within New Caledonia also support French loyalism. Brief 
overviews are given of Melanesian, Polynesian and Asian loyalists along with their 
differing levels of involvement in loyalist party politics. 
Chapter Two concentrates on loyalist party politics in New Caledonia, which 
have some distinctive features and form a political backdrop of great complexity. The 
politics of the largest loyalist party, the RPCR, are discussed. Attention is also given to 
the FN(NC) and the FC, the two principal parties of the extreme right, and extra-legal 
right-wing extremist groups collectively described as the tentation ultra. 
The essay concludes by examining the validity of using the term "Caldochie" to 
describe New Caledonia's loyalists and concludes that this term is neither 
geographically, ethnically nor politically valid. Following the RPCR's signature of the 
1988 Matignon Accords, mainstream loyalist support has been lent to the concept of a 
future New Caledonia in which both loyalists and independantistes might co-operate. 
Accordingly, the concept of an isolated loyalist community is no longer valid if indeed it 
ever was. 
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Verite Fraternite, Vivre Fran9ais. 
1 
Introduction 
Examinations of the New Caledonian political scene over recent years have 
tended to concentrate on the claims of the pro-independence FLNKS and the 
implications of those claims for the future of New Caledonia. Whether the vantage point 
of those outside observers offering commentary has been to the left or right wing, 
whether they have been francophone or anglophone, the centre of attention has been 
held by Melanesian claims to independence. Portrayals of the political majority, 
comprised predominantly of Europeans and non-European immigrants, who desire to 
continue close ties with France, have taken second place. Any mention of the political 
groups of the local Europeans, or Caldoches as they are known, has been a lower 
priority than the more newsworthy activities of the FLNKS. 
Certainly, Television New Zealand has preferred to interview the late Jean-
Marie Tjibaou rather than Jacques Lafleur, the leader of the loyalist RPCR. Similarly, 
representatives of the New Zealand Labour government since 1984 have concentrated 
their efforts on discussions with the FLNKS rather than on meeting leaders of the 
RPCR. Even Caldoche accounts of events in the 1980s have tended to look outwards at 
the independantistes , analysing them for better or worse, rather than at themselves. 
This essay will examine the loyalist camp, or Caldochie as French journalists 
have come to describe it since the mid-1980s, 1 and will attempt to highlight its internal 
dynamics and its frequently ignored internal divisions. Chapter One presents an 
overview of the different social and ethnic groups within the loyalist camp who have 
voted against independence in the 1980s, and describes how they delineate themselves 
from one another. Chapter Two consists of a brief examination of loyalist party politics 
in the 1980s and contentious issues both within and outside the RPCR. The essay's 
conclusion considers whether the concept of "Caldochie" is a valid one. 
Special mention should be made, at this stage, of the source material used in the 
following pages. Finding reliable source material on New Caledonia is generally not an 
easy task. Finding reliable sources on the topics outlined above is even less likely given 
the slant that many examinations of New Caledonia have involved. Commentary on 
New Caledonia frequently consists of outsiders' extreme reactions based more on the 
application of personal prejudices and preconceptions during visits to the Territory 
rather than on justifiable evidence. The mix of racial and political issues involved 
polarises thoughts to the extreme left and right. Marc Coulon and Thierry Desjardins 
are, respectively, good examples of these tendencies; they are prone to portraying their 
subjective realities at the expense of all others. Such journalists should be regarded 
more cautiously than more reliably informed Caldoche sources like Jacqueline Senes, or 
academics such as John Connell or Miriam Dornoy. The Caldoches themselves are also 
1 For example Le Monde 10/6/89 p.14. 
2 
prone to making extreme remarks, particularly when questioned by metropolitan French 
reporters during periods of great political tension. Comments made by Caldoches 
during the 1984-1985 period, whether they be the anonymous inhabitants of villages 
like Koumacl or Jacques Lafleur himself2 should be viewed as extreme reactions to 
trying circumstances rather than reflecting typical views. Unfortunately the latter are less 
likely to be found in the metropolitan French press because they are inherently less 
newsworthy. Herein lies the essential dilemma when dealing with much of the material 
available on New Caledonia: it tends to concentrate on extreme views or extreme 
circumstances. Attempts to draw general conclusions from such sources require a 
degree of caution and discrimination. 
1 Cf. Le Monde 2-3/12/84 p.9. 
2 Cf. ibid. 6-7/1/85 p.l. 
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Chapter One ... loyalist diversity 
Foreword: the demographic balance 
Any discussion of the complex political scene in New Caledonia must of 
necessity mention the unique demographic composition of the Territory. Unlike its 
Australian and New Zealand neighbours, whose colonisation in the nineteenth century 
produced twentieth century populations overwhelmingly dominated by Europeans, in 
New Caledonia haphazard and sometimes abortive settlement schemesl only succeeded 
in creating a European population with a rough numerical parity to the local Melanesian 
population by the 1980s. Despite the desire of some Caldoche and metropolitan French 
conservatives for the late mayor of Noumea Roger Laroque's planter du blanc solution 
to the lack of a clear European demographic majority,2 such a majority has never been 
attained. In only two periods, circa 1901 and 1969, has the European population in 
New Caledonia exceeded 40% of the total population. Bernard Brou, a Caldoche 
historian, cites New Caledonia as "une colonie de peuplement qui ne se peuple pas" 
and characterises the rate of European settlement as "un developpement excessivement 
lent, et meme parfois retrograde".3 In its 1983 census, the ITSEE estimated the total · 
population of New Caledonia as 145,368. Of that number 53,974 (37.1 %) were 
European and 61,870 (42.6%) were Melanesian. Non-European immigrants formed the 
remaining 29,524 inhabitants (20.3% of the population).4 
Although by no means forming a demographic majority, the European 
population in New Caledonia is not as outnumbered by non-European inhabitants as the 
European population in South Africa. Some outsiders have mistakenly attempted to 
equate the political and demographic conditions in New Caledonia with those of the 
white-ruled minority regime in South Africa. CORSO erroneously describes French 
settlement as an "apartheid system"5, heedless of the fact that New Caledonia's ethnic 
divisions predate the legal invention of the South Mrican apartheid system in the 1940s 
and are not embodied constitutionally as they are in South Africa. Neither homelands 
nor Bantustans exist in New Caledonia. Nor does electoral segregation. One of the 
salient features of New Caledonian political life since World War II has been the 
electoral consequences of the French Republic's decision to give Melanesians the vote 
1 See Jacqueline Senes: La Vie Ouotidienne en Nouvelle Caledonie de 1850 a nos jours p.143; John 
Connell: New Caledonia or Kanaky? pp.92-95. 
2 Op. cit. Le Monde 2-3/12/84 p.9. 
3 Bernard Brou: Peuplement et pQPulation de la Nouvelle Caledonie: La societe modeme pp.49, 50. 
4 Alain Christnacht: La Nouvelle-Caledonie p.25. 
5 CORSO: Kanaky: the Struggle for Independence in New Caledonia p.l. 
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in 1946. The Caldoche population in the post-war period has not felt so insecure that it 
has urged legislation to the same extremes as its Mrikaaner counterpart. 
Another mistaken assumption, made especially by Australian and New Zealand 
journalists, is that ethnic divisions in New Caledonia rigorously match political 
divisions. The unspoken assumption behind many an article or videoclip has been that 
all Europeans are French loyalists and all Melanesians are independantistes. Such an 
approach in Television New Zealand's news footage of New Caledonia in the 1984-85 
period favoured images of young FLNKS militants manning roadblocks, carrying 
shotguns, and throwing rocks at French gendarmes and riot police rather than the 
multiracial rallies of the RPCR against independence. The untidy truth is that political 
orientation in New Caledonia does not strictly follow racial lines. The most striking 
examples of this are the 1989 heads of the FLNKS and the RPCR. A Caldoche, 
Frangois Burck, was made the FLNKS President in May 1989, while the RPCR has a 
Melanesian, Simon Loueckhote, as its chairman of the Territorial Congress) Until 
1987 Dick Ukeiwe, another Melanesian, was the RPCR's President. Any simple 
bipolar political grouping of loyalist Caldoches in one camp and independantiste Kanaks 
in the other obscures the differences that exist both inside and between these ethnic 
groups. It also tends to minimalise or exclude altogether the presence of the 20.3% of 
New Caledonia's population who are neither Melanesian nor European. 
Caldocbe identity- internal and external distinctions 
It is nonetheless true that the European portion of New Caledonia's population 
is central to the political groups who oppose independence and favour continued links 
with France. Their 37.1% of the population can be broken down into two important 
groups: the Caldoches (those born or assimilated into the local European community); 
and the zozos or metros (those metropolitan French citizens residing in New 
Caledonia for a short period, or those who have settled but have not been assimilated by 
the Caldoches). Both Caldoche and metro are terms with psychological connotations 
often puzzling to the outsider. Being considered Caldoche is as much a state of mind as 
the result of any residential qualification. It is for this reason that many pieds-noirs who 
settled in New Caledonia after Algeria's independence found themselves easily accepted 
by the Caldoches, partly due to a shared colonial perspective. On the other hand, 
metropolitan French civil servants who have decided to stay on in New Caledonia and 
settle down have not always found the same easy acceptance, as Senes points out: 
Un metro adopte etait un phenomene rare, mais c'etait un homme heureux. Partie 
prenant du pays, it pouvait devenir Caledonien. A quel moment etait-il reconnu enfant 
de l'lle? A quels signes? Il est impossible dele preciser.2 
As vague as any precise definition of what may or may not make a French 
citizen residing in New Caledonia "Caldoche" is the origin of the word itself. It is 
generally accepted that the term was not in widespread use prior to the early 1970s, and 
was only first popularly used at the time of the nickel boom of 1970 to 1972. Beyond 
that, opinions differ. Alain SaussoP and Senes4 see the word's adoption as an 
assertion of local European identity at a time when metropolitan French immigration 
was high due to local economic prosperity. They see a dichotomy between "Caldoche" 
and "metro". Jean Guiart and those who support the FLNKS tend to see "Caldoche" in 
another light. Guiart attributes the word's invention to the Melanesian wife of the UC 
leader Maurice Lenormand who, in the early years of Melanesian electoral involvement 
shortly after World War II, contracted the phrase caledo-chose to form a derogatory 
name describing those who used the word Canaque in the same manner: 
1 Pacific Islands Monthly July 1989 pp.24-25. 
2 Senes p.234 
3 Alain Saussol: Trente milles «Caldoches>> en Nouvelle Caledonie p.129. 
4 Senes p.125. 
II [ «Caldoche»] designe les Caledoniens de souche europeenne. Con~u comme une 
replique melanesienne a l'appelation de canaque ... l 
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Here "Caldoche" is seen as being opposed to "Canaque". It was supposedly 
adopted some two decades later by local Europeans with the same pride that local 
Melanesians claimed the derogatory word Canaque to identify themselves. The adoption 
of the term Caldoche was done so largely as a reaction to the outspoken opinions of the 
first modern Melanesian independantistes in the late 1960s. For Guiart, "Caldoche" 
represents the local European population's assertion of its own identity separate to that 
of local Melanesians rather than a mark of separateness from the metropolitan French. 
Either or both of these explanations may be correct; the two are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Rene Brun offers another, less politicised, explanation of the 
origins of the term Caldoche: 
Au debut du siecle, une finale en «oche» etait d'usage courant dans le langage familier 
[p.e. Alboche= Allemand]. Alors, pourquoi ne pas penser que caldoche (meme epoque, 
meme formation) a ere dit pour Caledonien .. ? 2 
This explanation is more mundane than the previous two, but is more believable 
than Guiart's, if only because etymologists recognise it is generally unusual to be able 
to trace the origin of a colloquial term to one particular person. Brun's explanation is 
more plausible on linguistic grounds and is not a politically motivated description of the 
term's origins. The word Caldoche could have languished largely unused for over fifty 
years and could then have been revived either as a result of Melanesian political claims, 
the influx of metropolitan French during the nickel boom, or a combination of both 
factors. 
Whichever explanation is correct, the first two arguments over the word's 
origin serve to furnish some initial insights into the salient points of Caldoche identity. 
The Caldoches are ostensibly French, yet they regard the metropolitan French as 
outsiders; they consider themselves New Caledonians yet they do not identify with the 
Melanesian inhabitants of the Territory. The majority of Caldoches somehow manage a 
mental reconciliation of these tensions, which in the political arena have resulted in both 
identification with and antipathy or hostility towards both the metropolitan French and 
Melanesian independantistes over different issues. 
Despite their small numbers, it should not be imagined that the Caldoches are a 
totally homogenous group. Numbered variously at less than 30,000,3 around 30,0004 
or over 33,000,5 precise statistics on how many Caldoches live in New Caledonia are 
difficult to obtain for the following reasons. Firstly, there is the question of those 
inhabitants of mixed race, the metis . No exact data is available on their numbers, and 
their status in relation to the Caldoches is a grey area. No official census criteria exist in 
New Caledonia for categorising metis separately and there was Kanak opposition to the 
1983 census decision to class all metis as Caldoches rather than as Melanesians or 
Polynesians and so forth. 6 Then there is the equally complicated question of the metros. 
As mentioned above, merely living in the Territory does not automatically mean a metro 
is regarded by the Caldoches as a member of their community. Also, within that 
community itself there exists a striking number of internal divisions through which the 
Caldoches differentiate themselves from one another. At the top of the Caldoche social 
hierarchy are the "Fifty Families", descendants of the earliest settlers who even today 
form a tight-knit group, not only through intermarriage, but through business dealings 
and financial links.? Beneath this "old money" are a number of other social groups 
1 Jean Guiart in Le Monde 2-3/12/84 p.9. 
2 Ibid. 2-3/12/84 p.9. 
3 Marc Coulon; L'irruption kanak de Ca16donie a Kanaky p.70. 
4 Saussol p.129. 
5 Connell p.214. 
6 Ibid. p.236. 
7 Miriam Domoy: Politics In New Caledonia p.60. 
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who, as in other former colonies such as Australia and New Zealand, have a level of 
social standing dependent on the length of time their families have been settled in New 
Caledonia, and on the social origins of their ancestors as Jean-Pierre Doumenge notes: 
.. .l'anciennete d'etablissement cree... des solidarites internes (on est colons 
Bourbonnais, colons Feillet, descendants d'immigres alsaciens-lorrains, descendants de 
deportes de la Commune, descendants de bagnards, arrives dans l'entre-deux-guerres ou 
pendant le «boom» de 1967-1972). On se sent aussi «pieds-noirs» d'Afrique du Nord, 
Bretons, Italiens, Corses.1 
Doumenge also adds that metros are socially marginalised by the Caldoches 
mainly on the basis of their comparitively recent arrival. In such a young society, with a 
history that started only in the 1850s, the length of residence of a Caldoche family in 
New Caledonia has great social significance. Along with wealth, material possessions 
and most importantly (like the Melanesians) land,2 it is a sign of legitimacy which 
assumes greater importance than in older, less insular European settler nations like the 
United States. The duration of Caldoche occupancy assumes paramount importance 
given the external pressures the Caldoches have faced since the 1960s; rising 
Melanesian land and independence claims; and the metropolitan French response to 
those claims which has resulted in seven different Territorial plans and statutes since 
1976. * It implies assimilation into the Territory and its ways and a supposed depth of 
understanding of local affairs which are quite reasonably jealously guarded against what 
is regarded as the arbitrary dirigisme of successive metropolitan administrators. Senes 
traces this strand of Caldoche sentiment back to the administration of Governor Feillet 
in the 1890s, after which: 
L'opinion de ce petit pays sera absolument intraitable a l'egard du fonctionnaire dote 
d'une originalite trop aigue ou d'un plan d'action trop autoritaire. En 1900 de M. le 
gouverneur Feillet, en 1940 de l'autoritaire amiral d'Argenlieu, en 1985 du solitaire 
Edgard Pisani, la Caledonie dite «des Caldoches» refusera absolument les diktats.3 
The marks of this assimilation into the Territory are perhaps less evident than 
some Caldoches would wish. In his fondness for the image of Caldoche assimilation 
and authenticity, in 1980 Brou went so far as to use the term europeens indigenes 4 
when discussing the Caldoches and suggested a degree of assimilation into the local 
environment more imagined than real: "N'existe-t-il pas dans la brousse caledonienne, 
des Europeens qui vi vent «comme des indigenes» ?"5 If such creatures do exist they 
form only a very small minority even amongst broussards for whom, as for an 
increasing number of Melanesians, it is more normal to wear European clothes, drive 
European cars and live in European housing. Nevertheless, the import of such claims 
and the Caldoche opposition to changes from different metropolitan administrations 
serve to underline the heartfelt sentiment that because the Caldoches live in New 
Caledonia they are therefore better adapted to understand local conditions than outsiders 
who should not be meddling in matters they cannot comprehend. Jean-Marie 
Colombani, who was born in Noumea, believes that therein lies the key to any metro 
gaining acceptance and recognition in Caldoche society. It is necessary to accede to the 
Caldoche belief of their superiority on home ground: 
1 Jean-Pierre Doumenge: Les Melanesiens et la societe pluriethnique en Nouvelle-Caledonie p.l02. 
2 See Jean-Marie Colombani: L Utopie caledonienne pp.113-114. 
* Cf below pp.30-32. 
3 Senes p.165. 
4 Brou p.21. 
5 Ibid. p.31. 
Le critere determinant pour qu'un «zozo» soit classe «caldoche» n'est ni le lieu de 
naissance, ni le nombre d'annees passees sur le territoire, mais une forme d'esprit qui 
consiste dans I' adoption sans reserve d'un certain nombre de postulats, dont le premier 
rejette l'ingerance de Paris dans les affaires locales.l 
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This is the main reason for the Caldoches' dislike of metros. However 
conservative civil servants or even government heads may be, they do not necessarily 
accept that the Caldoches are better informed or equipped to deal with the administration 
of local problems. They view the Caldoches as having a provincial, sometimes racist 
outlook, and point to the dependent state of New Caledonia's economy as one reason 
why the Caldoches need metropolitan expertise.* They are not alone in this sentiment. 
Other metropolitan French have remarked on the Caldoches' lack of education and 
cultural refinement.2 Such remarks are seldom very positive. For example, here is 
Guiart's summary of the importance of culture and a good education for the Caldoches: 
La culture pour les europeens [de Ia Nouvelle-Caledonie], c'est ce qu'on apprend au 
Lycee pour passer Ia Baccalaureat et que l'on s'empresse d'oublier par Ia suite.3 
There is a large amount of metropolitan snobbery in this observation. It is 
conveniently forgotten that similar generalisations could equally be made about the 
metropolitan French, or any English-speaking country on the Pacific rim. The 
Caldoches themselves, whether or not they feel culturally inferior, certainly do not 
reveal any cultural cringe. Knowledge of their local environment is sufficient to make 
them feel intellectually secure. Jacques Lafleur's scorn for outside experts is typical: 
Cela fait des annees que chaque personne qui debarque a Noumea a trouve Ia solution 
en quarante-huit heures et compris tout de suite Ia coutume canaque!4 
Whether Jacques Lafleur truly understands Kanak custom either is a moot point 
but he, as a Caldoche, implicitly regards himself as better qualified to comment on it and 
other local affairs than any Johnny-come-lately metro. Colombani refers to this 
sentiment as "le vieux reflexe «anti-zozo» selon lequelle Neo-Caledonien avait, dans le 
domaine des affaires locales, une qualification innee qu'un metropolitain, filt-il diplome, 
ne pouvait acquerir qu'apres un long sejour. "5 
The metros - inauthentic but necessary 
While the Caldoches may distrust the metros and regard them as socially 
inferior, at the same time it is recognised their presence is necessary and their numbers 
are such that they cannot be totally ignored. The 1983 ITSEE census lists some 16,844 
French inhabitants born outside New Caledonia, either Europeans from mainland 
France and former French colonies (95%) or from the Overseas Departments of 
Reunion, Guadeloupe and Martinique (5% ). 6 Of those French citizens originating from 
mainland France and former French colonies, by far the largest portion consists of 
metros. French citizens from former colonies like Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and from 
sub-Saharan Africa number only around 2,000 inhabitants.7 The metros perform 
diverse functions within New Caledonia as administrators, police, teachers, health 
workers or as military personnel. Connell boldly asserts that they have no long-term 
interest in staying in New Caledonia and are attracted to the Territory as a posting where 
1 Colombani p.25. 
* Cf. below p.34. 
2 Claude Gabriel and Vincent Kermel: La revolte kanake p.58. 
Coulon pp.35, 59-60, 71. 
3 Jean Guiart: La terre est le sang des morts p.290. 
4 Le Monde 6-7 /l/85 p.l. 
5 Colombani p.53. 
6 Ibid. p.28. 
7 Op. cit. Connell p.216. 
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they can enjoy a sunny, relaxed Pacific lifestyle and the higher pay rates offered to those 
working outside mainland France. It is this supposed preoccupation with short-term 
material gain rather than any genuine interest in New Caledonia itself which has earned 
them the dislike of the Caldoches. Connell states that zozo is an abbreviation of 
zoreilles , a snipe at those whose ears prick up at the mention of the higher wages 
offered to workers in New Caledonia. Another nickname used for them is cinq-cinqs, 
"five point fivers", which according to Connell is a reference to those metros who 
constantly mentally convert Pacific francs back to metropolitan ones to ascertain what 
local prices are in "real money".l 
The metros may be singled out as different and foreign, but the role they play in 
the functioning of the Territory is indispensable and their presence is an electoral 
advantage for the Caldoches. The presence of approximately 14,000 non-Caldoche 
French amongst the 53,000 plus local Europeans (around 26% of their total in 1983) is 
widely regarded as being important during elections. Metro electors living in New 
Caledonia vote overwhelmingly in accordance with the loyalist RPCR: 
Les fonctionnaires de Noumea participent peu a la vie politique, du moins directement. 
Mais ils constituent une masse electorale dont !'interet coincide avec l'immobilisme 
des autres groupes de la communaute europeen ... Aussi votent-ils sans etat d'ame pour 
le parti du statu quo , le RPCR, et s'insurgent-ils avec indignation contre la violence 
des Kanaks qui trouble leur sejour.2 
Their eligibility to vote, along with that of Polynesian and other recent non-
European immigrants,* has been disputed by the FLNKS. For the FLNKS these 
comparitively recent arrivals do not fulfil the party's "victims of history" definition. The 
FLNKS held in 1987 that electoral eligibility in New Caledonia should be confined to 
those citizens whose parents were born in the Territory) Prior to the 13 September 
1987 Territorial self-determination referendum, the RPCR partially recognised the 
issues this argument raised by moving that voter eligibility should be restricted to those 
residing in the Territory for at least three years. As a result 12.5% of European voters 
were disqualified from the referendum, a sustainable loss given the FLNKS's boycott 
decision.4 On the basis of past elections in which the FLNKS had actively participated 
such as the 29 September 1985 Regional Elections, this loss was not of great 
importance. Even then 12.5% of the European electorate would not have been decisive 
given that those voters inhabited Noumea and its environs.s The RPCR received 70% 
of the vote there in September 1985.6 
For the Caldoches, the presence of the metros is electorally indispensable. They 
swell RPCR voting numbers without embroiling themselves in local party politics as 
well as contributing essential services to the Territory's administration. Nor is it likely 
that the RPCR would ever lose metro support. If Connell is correct, it is not in their 
best interest to have their stays in New Caledonia upset by the changes claimed by 
independantistes and their uncertain implications for the CFP exchange rate, Noumea's 
sunny lifestyle and their high rates of pay. 
The metros themselves are more aware of their special status and its 
complexities than the Caldoches are. For Paris-based administrators previously sent to 
other provincial postings, either in France's other DOM-TOM or even within 
continental France's outlying regions, much of what they experience would not be new. 
Metros are half a world away from home, living on a French tropical island, yet find 
1 Connell pp.219-220. 
2 Jean-Paul Besset: Le dossier caledonien p.48. 
* Cf. below p.23. 
3 Alan Clark: Constitutional Dynamic. Political Risk: Self-Determination in New Caledonia. 1986-
1.2.81 p.12. 
4 Le Monde 16/9/87 p.9. 
5 66% of all immigrants live in and around Noumea. See Connell p.219. 
6 Clark: Conflict Formal and Informal: Elections in New Caledonia 1984-1986 p.102. 
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themselves regarded as outsiders by the local European inhabitants. Living and working 
in Noumea, they are materially comfortable, yet find the town lacking in the galleries, 
music and nightlife they enjoyed in Paris and other larger metropolitan centres. There 
are those metros who also find the Caldoches rather provincial. The following grafitti 
were in 1989 to be found on the wall of a fashionable shopping mall in Noumea's 
Quartier Latin : 
C'est pas cool, Noumea 
Babas 
Ringards 
Vite - fait que le cholera revienne 
Skinhead de Paris 6e RPIMa 
Thus at least one soldier posted to New Caledonia has expressed his disgust for 
Noumea and its inhabitants. How widely such views are held within military enlisted 
circles is hard to judge, but such cafard is a traditional problem for troops stationed 
thousands of kilometres away from home. 
The issue of prior occupancy 
The Caldoches have an easier task asserting their length of residence as a mark 
of social and political ascendancy over metros in local affairs than they do when faced 
by the undeniable Melanesian claim to prior occupancy of New Caledonia. The 
Caldoche attitude to metro newcomers is morally shaken by the realisation that they too 
are comparative newcomers in relation to the local Melanesian inhabitants of New 
Caledonia. The mystery surrounding the precise origins of the Lapita potmakers, the 
original settlers of New Caledonia some 4,000 years ago,l has allowed the occasional 
Caldoche amateur ethnographer and conservative metropolitan French writer to reduce 
the Melanesians to the status of merely being a wave of invaders. According to this 
argument, although having arrived earlier than the French, Melanesians can in no way 
claim moral ascendancy over French settlers because the Melanesians too must have 
disrupted or destroyed an even earlier culture. Those Caldoches who hold such views 
see it as only natural that just as the Melanesians displaced some previous culture in a 
Darwinist struggle of the fittest, so too the French have that right. Lands distributed to 
colonists under the French colonial administration are considered to have more validity 
than pre-colonial Melanesian land boundaries. Here is Yves Devillelongue, the man 
who Jean-Marie Tjibaou replaced as Mayor ofHienghene in 1977: 
Cette histoire de premier occupant ne tient pas debout. Si on s'amuse a chercher dans 
chaque pays qui etait la le premier, on n'a pas fini de demenager. D'ailleurs, les 
Canaques eux-memes ont ete precedes par d'autres zoulous. 11 y a 4,000 ans ... 2 
M. Devillelongue's reference to Zulus is no doubt based less on any hard 
archaeological evidence than on his own cultural assumption that one sort of native is 
much the same as another. The implication here is that even if the Caldoches were not 
the original occupants of New Caledonia, it is now too late to contemplate restoring the 
old status quo. One might as well attempt to give France back to the Gauls. It is a view 
that conveniently reinforces the current status quo and simultaneously undermines 
Melanesian legitimacy. 
Conjectures on the true identity of the settlers in New Caledonia prior to the 
Melanesian "invasion" vary. Some conservatives like Eric Agostini keep their 
speculations suggestively vague, lest history prove them wrong: "il semble bien qu'il y 
1 Connell p.l. 
2 Op. cit. Lionel Duroy: Hienghene. le desespoir caledonien pp.180-181. 
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ait eu avant l'emprise melanesienne une civilisation anterieure ( et de race blanche selon 
certains). "1 
Others speculate with an aplomb that might even make Erik von Daniken blench. 
Of these amateur Caldoche ethnographers, the palmes acadimiques must be awarded to 
Roger Ludeau for his claim that "les authentiques premiers occupants de ce Territoire" 
were members of a hybrid Mayan-Uighur civilisation.2 How Central American Indians 
and a Central Asian nomadic people managed to cosettle a remote South Pacific island 
around 2000BC is uncertain, but such unsubstantiated claims are doubtless motivated 
more by the desire to construct a moral case against the legitimacy of Melanesian land 
claims in the 1980s than by academically sound concerns for local ethnography. 
Similar fairytales have arisen in New Zealand to counter Maori legitimacy. The 
Moriori are another race of supposed original occupants who were a staple of New 
Zealand historical myth for many decades. Rather than being considered as the original 
occupants of the Chatham Islands, it was popularly held that they were the original 
occupants of mainland New Zealand and were displaced by Maori "invaders". 3 In April 
1989, a Wellington-based group was criticised by the Race Relations Conciliator for 
printing a pamphlet which described a mysterious race of "white Maoris" as New 
Zealand's first occupants. Such quests into the origins of original occupants, both in 
New Zealand and New Caledonia, are indicators of both Caldoche and Pakeha 
insecurity. In New Caledonia, where the European population does not enjoy the 
numerical predominance of its New Zealand counterpart, that insecurity is much more 
pronounced and manifests itself in more forceful forms than mere pamphleteering by 
members of the extreme right. In May 1988 it was claimed by Le Point that there were 
some 300 armed Caldoche militiamen in Noumea.4 
The broussards - the people of the land? 
The sector of Caldoche society which feels the most insecure and encroached 
upon are the broussards, those who live up country from Noumea in villages or on 
farms. The broussards play a central role in the Caldoche mystique: they are the last of 
the pioneers, descendants of the rugged families who cleared away virgin bush to make 
way for the civilising effects of European agriculture on the untamed landscape; a noble 
breed whose very mention invokes epithets like "the salt of the earth" or "l'air d'une 
brute au creur tendre" as Desjardins would say.s The stock image is of a bronzed 
outdoorsman (or woman in Desjardins' case6) astride a horse herding cattle in a cloud 
of dust. This image is as central to the Caldoche sense of identity as the Australian 
stockman is to Australians, or the high country sheep farmer is to New Zealanders. As 
with its Australian and New Zealand counterparts, it is an image that has faded in 
importance since World War II but still rings true for those Caldoches who grew up in 
the interwar period. 
As in Australia and New Zealand, this cultural accent on the Territory's rural 
heritage masks the true weight of rural inhabitants in demographic, economic, social 
and political terms. The most important element of New Caledonia's internal migration 
since the 1960s has been the movement of broussards away from the rural areas of the 
west and east coasts to Noumea.7 By the time of the 1983 ITSEE census, 31,945 
(59%) of New Caledonia's 53,974 Europeans were living in the commune ofNoumea. 
1 Eric Agostini: Le Melanesien et le droit p.81. 
2 Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes 29/2/84 op. cit. AFC: Nouvelle-Calooonie: combat pour les droits de 
l'homme 1981-1984 p.llO. Ludeau is the head of the Association des amis des Etats-Unis. See Le 
Monde 9/3/85 p.6. 
3 See Michael King: Moriori: A People Rediscovered. 
4 Le Point 23/5/88 p.34. 
5 Desjardins p.43. 
6 Ibid. pp.48-49. 
7 Connell p.232. 
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The remaining 22,000 were distributed along the east and west coasts of the Grande 
Terre, over 18,100 of whom lived on the west coast.l Of New Caledonia's European 
inhabitants, perhaps only 500 families are still employed solely in agriculture. The 
1983 ITSEE census lists 227 male and 23 female cattle ranchers, and 204 male and 41 
female farmers, an unspecified number of whom were metis. 2 Commercial agriculture, 
largely the domain of Caldoche farmers due to the Melanesian tendency for subsistence 
agriculture, has diminished at a rapid rate, falling from 10% of the Territory's GNP in 
1965 to only 2% by 1985.3 Guiart stresses that the most important broussard economic 
activities are now based on commerce and services rather than on agriculture. Even 
Bourail, the second largest Caldoche centre outside Noumea after Dumbea, is no longer 
the agricultural centre it once was.4 Saussol sees fit to list those who work solely as 
cattle-farmers last in his summary of broussard social categories: 
La brousse inclut trois categories de citoyens caledoniens - les citadins des bourgs 
importants (La Foa, Bourail, Kone, Koumac, Poindimie. Cites minieres - Houai'lou, 
Thio et Nepoui); les petits colons (fils de colons dans le commerce ou l'artisanat ou 
!'administration); et les eleveurs.5 
Of the eleveurs it is important to distinguish between the "landed gentry" of the 
Fifty Families with their large runholdings and the petits blancs with their small, often 
uneconomic farms. It is the latter who have been hardest hit by New Caledonia's 
agricultural decline since the 1960s. Astute broussard families avoided this downturn by 
investing in mining. In the case of the Lafleurs, this occurred as early as the 1930s.6 At 
the time of the nickel boom in the late 1960s there were some 110 petits mineurs . This 
small group profited from the increased demand in nickel either by competing on the 
buoyant nickel market, or by selling their mining operations to the SLN.7 The nickel 
boom drew the interest of investors away from agriculture. By the 1980s mining 
comprised 90% of New Caledonia's exports.8 The New Caledonian mining industry 
had been monopolised by the SLN to the extent that only four petit mineur companies 
survived: Jacques Lafleur's SMSP, Ballande, Pentecost and the SNN.9 
The petits blancs were the section of broussard society which had neither the 
capital nor the versatility to take advantage of the nickel boom. Connell describes them 
as the New Caledonian social group least capable of adapting to economic change; "the 
real Caldoches who can rarely conceive of a future outside their own humble 
agricultural existence, oriented to a few hectares of poor land and a few cattle, 
supplemented by employment (perhaps seasonally), and hunting and fishing".l0 This 
picture is radically different from the one held by metropolitan Frenchman of New 
Caledonian rural life. As Jean-Charles Moglia, an FN(NC) supporter from Bourail 
cynically commented in 1988: 
En France, tout le monde croit que nous [les broussards] sommes riches, racistes, et 
que nous exploitons les Melanesiens. C'est stupide. Nous sommes des fauches. Nous 
travaillons seuls.ll 
Sons of broussard farmers have increasingly been forced to look beyond the 
confines of the family farm for employment, seeking jobs either in Noumea, or in the 
provincial centres. The result has been a decline in the broussard population since the 
1 Connell p.222. 
2 Ibid. p.141. 
3 Ibid. p.142. 
4 Ibid. p.222; Guiart p.235. 
5 Saussol p.138. 
6 Le Point 19/12/88 p.83. 
7 Connell p.132. 
8 Ibid. p.133. 
91bid. 
10 Ibid. p.141. 
11 Le Monde 4/11/88 p.9. 
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1960s.The average age of the rural population has increased. It has become 
increasingly common for only one son to remain behind on the farm to help his parents. 
A similar but less pronounced urban drift amongst Melanesians since the 1960s resulted 
in 68% of New Caledonia's agricultural workforce being over 50 years of age by 
1984.1 
Such changes have been destabilising influences on the strong family ties of the 
colons agricoles , with their emphasis on the strength of the family pitted against the 
natural environment, and a belief (like the Melanesians) in patriarchal control and group 
activity as opposed to individuality.2 Guiart has noted high levels of broussard 
alcoholism, particularly amongst the petits blancs of Poum, Koumac and Ouegoa in the 
north of the Grande Terre, those settlements most distant from Noumea.3 These petits 
blancs, considered socially inferior by most Caldoches and also by many Melanesians, 
include metis and the descendants of convicts from nineteenth century penal colonies. 
Their education is considered substandard even in Caldoche terms, and their numbers 
include illiterates, while their world view seldom exceeds the confines of their valley. 
What hopes they have for the future, with or without political change, remain grim. 
For all their importance in the Caldoche psyche, it is the broussards who have 
felt themselves the most misunderstood and ignored sector of Caldoche society during 
the political events of recent years. Broussards were those most exposed to FLNKS 
militantism between 1984 and 1985. Materially, broussard inhabitants on the east coast 
of the Grande Terre suffered worst. Centres like Hienghene and Thio were the hardest 
hit by arson and bombings between November 1984 and February 1985. Hienghene 
experienced 370.5 million CFP, and Thio 401 million CFP, in property damage. By 
way of comparison, Noumea suffered only 2.8 million CFP in property damage over 
the same period.4 Such destruction of property, the erection of FLNKS roadblocks and 
Eloi Machoro's occupation of the mining town of Thio prompted over 2,000 "refugees" 
to shift to Noumea. They were rehoused in the vacant tower blocks of the Noumean 
suburb of Saint Quentin by the French authorities.5 In Hienghene alone, 294 
broussards were evacuated between 4-6 December 1984.6 Exactly how many have 
returned subsequently is unclear, but the east coast in particular suffered a permanent 
loss in European inhabitants. By 1988, Jean-Claude Besset described it as "totalement 
desertee par les Europeens".7 
Broussards also feel they have suffered economic misfortune as a direct 
consequence of being deserted and neglected by the Noumea-centered Territorial 
administration, and are disdainful of "weekend farmers" or Caldoche absentee 
landlords, of whom the largest individual landholder is Jacques Lafleur 8, The 
broussards have some cause for resentment as they, like the Melanesians, also suffer 
from the land distribution situation. By 1988, less than 8% of New Caledonia's 
landowners still owned 75% of the land and the broussards see such people ("les 
grandes families de Noumea") as not being sufficiently tied to the land they own.9 Both 
outside observers and the Caldoches themselves have pointed out this animosity that 
broussards feel for their comparatively affluent Noumean fellows. Jean-Claude 
Guillebaud wrote from Bourail in 1980: 
1 Connell pp. 238; 140. 
2 Duroy pp.187-188. 
3 Guiart p.277; cf. Le Point 28/8/89 p.35. 
4 Connell p.343. 
5 Ibid. p.344. 
6 Duroy p.249. 
7 Besset p.37. 
8 Connell p.136. 
9 Besset p.37. 
Partout, j'entendrai ainsi les colons, petits ou moyens, pester contre les grands 
domaines mal cultives par quelques richissimes habitants de Noumea. Ballande, 
Pentecost, Lafleur ... Des gens d'une autre race. Sans vrais liens avec la terre.l 
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Once again, occupation of land and assimilation to it are the crux of social 
differentiation. Just as the typical Noumean Caldoche feels himself or herself a cut 
above zozos, whose metropolitan backgrounds render them unqualified to pass 
appropriate judgements on local affairs, so too the broussard is distrustful of 
Noumeans. They are stereotyped as being soft, shallow, materialistic and corrupted by 
urban living. They are characterised as inauthentic Caldoches, only weekend farmers at 
best, who have turned their backs on the pioneer ethic of their ancestors. The comment 
one anonymous inhabitant of Koumac made to Le Monde summarises this sentiment 
neatly: "pendant que nous moisissons ici, en brousse, ils [les habitants de Noumea] se 
baignent et se dorent au soleil sur les plages. "2 
The marked broussard animosity felt towards Noumeans which Guillebaud 
noticed in 1980 has intensified during the last decade. The most outstanding broussard 
in his detestation of the "old boy" system of the Noumean copains 3 isM. Justin 
Guillemard, the Mayor of Bourail, described as the "porte-parole des broussards".4 
Guillemard was expelled from the RPCR in 1987, ostensibly for his outspokenness in 
rejecting the RPCR's proposal of a three year residential qualification for voter 
eligibility in the September 1987 self-determination referendum. Guillemard went so far 
as to attack "les affairistes de Noumea" in front of the Territorial Congress.5 He 
despises self-centered big business interests for their lack of concern over "les petits" 
of the bush, blaming them for the economic neglect of broussards: 
Ces gens-la sont aveugles par leurs affaires. Moi, je ne defends pas les gros, je defends 
les petits, en particulier tous les broussards qui se sont refugies a Noumea en 1984 et 
1985 et qui vivent dans les conditions miserables ... de Saint Quentin. 6 
The increased pressure of Melanesian land claims was compounded, in the 
minds of broussards, by the overseeing presence of the socialist Mitterrand government 
from 1981 to 1986. It was commonly assumed that the Mitterrand administration's 
sympathies lay with Melanesian independantistes - "un gouvernement qui se met en 
quatre pour leur etre agreable".7 Broussards even sought to place the entire blame for 
New Caledonia's ethnic divisions on the PS government, being reluctant to look closer 
to home for the causes. The following statement was made in 1984 by a broussard 
foreman at Thio: 
Et puis, nous ne sommes pas contre eux [les Melanesiens]. C'est le gouvemement qui 
a menti a tout le monde. C'est maintenant a lui de nous tirer de la. 8 
His message was that there is no problem in the bush, only in a Paris 
government which had led everyone astray. The PS government was a convenient 
scapegoat for many Caldoches between 1981 and 1986. It was accused of being either 
communist or "de forte inspiration marxiste"9 partly as a result of having four PC 
ministers. The Caldoches, and in particular the broussards, felt betrayed in 1984 during 
the FLNKS's disruption of the November Territorial Assembly Elections when it 
became clear that the government gendarmes and CRS were not necessarily present 
merely to act as Caldoche bodyguards. At Bourail on 26 December 1984, local 
1 Jean-Claude Guillebaud: Un voyage en Oceanie p.125. 
2 Le Monde 2-3/12/84 p.9. 
3 J. Guillemard in Le Monde 12/9/87 p.8. 
4 Ibid. 28/5/87 p.lO. 
5 Ibid. 7-8/6/87 p.6. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Bernard Sylvano and Rene Renneteau: Une Epine dans le Caillou p.14. 
8 Le Monde 29/11/84 p.12. 
9 Sylvano and Renneteau p.14. 
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broussards were reportedly shocked when gendarmes were ordered to clear their two 
roadblocks as well as FLNKS ones. There was a bitter sense of treason; that both 
parties were French and that the gendarmes should be controlling the FLNKS and not 
broussard lawlessness. One young woman present at the scene cried out: "On vous a 
meme offert une bouteille de champagne pour le reveillon et aujourd'hui vous nous 
trahissez!"1 At that time Jacques Lafleur began talking of the Caldoche community's 
need to defend itself: "La Nouvelle-Caledonie doit se trouver aujourd'hui en etat de 
legitime defense. "2 The implication was that the PS government could not be trusted to 
do this. 
The phrase legitime defense was to have an ugly echo in the case of the ambush 
of ten FLNKS members at Hienghene on 5 December 1984. The defense of the Lapetite 
family and their accomplices centered on a plea of self-defence. It was argued that 
because Hienghene's gendarmes had been disarmed on 21 November 1984 under the 
orders of Colonel Marchasson, the commander of the gendarmerie, they were unable to 
maintain law and order.3 When unidentified FLNKS militants began burning down 
houses at night around Hienghene, these gendarmes were accused of inactivity and even 
of sympathy with the FLNKS. Marie-Jose Vanhalle, a Hienghene RPCR 
representative, said of the gendarmerie that "j'avais !'impression qu'ils etaient d'accord 
avec Jean-Marie Tjibaou. Ils laissaient faire. Ils faisaient expres."4 Cut off, and in the 
absence by default of representatives of French Republican law and order, the 
inhabitants of Hienghene decided to take matters into their own hands. Hienghene's 
Post Office was turned into a guardhouse for the local milice d'autodefense ,5 with ten 
rifles and three thousand rounds of ammunition stockpiled there. 6 The ambush of 
FLNKS members by the Lapetites with Maurice Mitride was reportedly provoked by 
the arson of Odette Mitride's house. The jury which acquitted them on 29 September 
1987 believed they were justified in ambushing the ten Melanesians, thought by the 
Lapetites to be responsible for this and other acts of arson. 7 This was also the belief of 
Marie-Jose Vanhalle, although it was never proven that the ten dead men were involved 
in acts of arson: "J'estime que leur reaction [celle des Lapetite], certes violent, est un 
acte de legitime defense. "8 
Broussard intransigeance and their willingness to reach for a gun is another 
stereotypical aspect of their personalities- a Wild West approach where the law comes 
from a pointed gun barrel. In the past, broussards have had no hesitations over 
clandestine political activity against any group regarded as a threat, whether it be their 
descent on Noumea in 1940 against the authoritarian Admiral d'Argenlieu, or in 1958 
their similar abduction of ten UC Territorial Assembly members who were illegally 
imprisoned at Bourai1.9 This willingness to resort to force is no longer as powerful as it 
once was, if only because of the broussards' falling numbers. The days when an armed 
broussard militia could descend on Noumea and deliver a violent coup are over: 
11 n'y a plus assez de colons vivants de la terre pour constituer une masse armee 
efficace. Ceux qui survivent sont pour la plupart ages de plus de soixante ans, et ne 
peuvent rallier autour d'eux qu'un petit nombre de jeunes hommes restes a Ia 
maison .. .lO 
1 Le Monde 27/12/84 p.6. 
2 Ibid. p.l. 
3 Duroy p.226. 
4 Ibid. p.246. 
5 The Lapetites were not involved in this militia. See Ibid. p.238. 
6 Ibid. p.241. 
7 Ibid. p.238; BIPA White File 29/9/87. 
8 Duroy p.272. 
9 Connell p.249. 
10 Guiart pp.249-250. 
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If the number of "refugees" who moved to Noumea during the 1984-85 period 
is taken as an indicator, the broussard capacity to resist has generally weakened.* 
Others had already left their lands prior to that confrontational period. Many broussards 
took advantage of land reforms to sell off some or all of their land at a profit and retire 
to Noumea, particularly after the 1978 Dijoud Plan when Caldoche offers of land sales 
exceeded FADIL's budgeted purchasing power.l 
There are those broussards though, particularly those over fifty years of age, 
whose resolve to retain firm ownership of their land has not weakened. M. Florendo 
Paladini for example, who in the mid-1980s had the following message written on a 
sign outside his farm at Ouano: 
PROPRIETE PRIVEE. DEFENSE ABSOLVE DE CIRCULER HORS DE LA 
ROUTE, DE CRASSER, TOUCHER, COUPER, PRENDRE QUOI QUE CE SOIT 
SOUS PEINE DES 1RIBUNAUX 2 
The above may be an extreme case of possessiveness, but illustrates just how 
jealously certain broussards watch over their land. Advancing age and expanding land 
reforms can weaken this resolve, but on occasions the two factors combine and result in 
a hardening of resolve, particularly during troublesome times like the 1984-85 period of 
unrest. A septuagenarian talking to Jacques Lafleur during a 1985 visit to the Vallee des 
Arabes ably demonstrates this: "On laisse faire les terroristes du FLNKS! Sij'etais plus 
jeune, crois-moi Jacques, j'en aurai deja envoye plus d'un les quatre pattes en l'air!"3 
Fear as well as possessiveness is the cause of such verbal aggressiveness. The 
broussards' fear of Melanesians stems directly from the 1878 and 1917 rebellions and 
the resulting massacres of isolated colon families living in the bush. The fear still exists 
that it might happen again some time, a feeling aggravated by the tension over 
independence in the mid-1980s. It is believed that the Kanaks have not changed their 
ways since the days of past rebellions. According to M. Yves Devillelongue:t "En 
1917 ils [les Kanaks] mangeaient encore du Blanc." Another Hienghene local, Henri 
Garnier, added: "Ils ne changeront jamais. "4 
It is for this reason amongst others that broussard paranoia was so widespread 
in 1984 and 1985. There was a very real fear that another 1878- or 1917-style 
Melanesian uprising was about to occur. Le Monde caught this mood and the siege 
mentality it invoked in an article on the inhabitants of the northern centre of Koumac, 
where broussards barricaded themselves in and set up guards to wait for the worst. One 
of those guards described how he saw the Melanesians: "Vous ne les connaissez pas, 
monsieur, ils sont capables de venir a la nuit et de nous massacrer pendant notre 
sommeil. Ce sont des Hiches. "5 
This may or may not have been correct, but the broussards themselves believed 
so, partly because they were brought up to think such things. The reporter present was 
observant enough to realise that much of the adult fear he witnessed was born out of 
childhood bogeyman stories. He overheard a mother saying to her restless baby: "Situ 
pleures, les Canaques viendront te chercher. "6 How much fear and racism have resulted 
from such remarks over the years? It is unfortunate such things are not statistically 
quantifiable. 
Despite their attitudes being affected almost from birth by tales of past rebellions 
and massacres, the broussards feel they know "their" Kanaks with the same assurance 
that an Afrikaaner feels he knows "his" blacks. Broussards freely mix racism with 
* See above p.12. 
1 Colombani p.20. 
2 Le Monde 9/3/85 p.6. 
3 Le Nouvel Observateur 27/9/85 p.26. 
t Cf. above p.9. 
4 Duroy p.224. 
5 Le Monde 2-3/12/84 p.l. 
6 Ibid. 
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varying amounts of paternalism when talking about Melanesians. They are viewed as 
uppity children, but basically goodhearted ones, who are susceptible to bad outside 
influences and do not know their place. Philippe Marlier, an FN(NC) organiser and 
shopkeeper from Kone who had his business burnt down on 30 October 1984 claimed 
that "le Canaque est un petit gosse; on lui donne un bonbon, il en veut un deuxieme."l 
On 16 December 1984, the arson of a shop in Bourailleft three people dead including 
one gendarme.2 Some days later Tonton Pierrot, a cattle rancher from Bourail 
concluded that the Kanaks were "pas mauvais du tout" and attributed their behaviour to 
too much alcohol; "c'est la bouteille qui les perd". Another bad influence was assumed 
by Tonton Pierrot to be the "cures defroques" who fill the Melanesians' heads with talk 
of independence. His nephew, Joel, respected Melanesians too, but only so long as 
they knew their place: "le Kanak, le Melano, c'est un bon mec quand il reste dans son 
coin."3 
Any movement out of his "corner" is regarded as an intrusion, in particular 
where Melanesian land claims are concerned. Joel Pierrot advocated "la terre a ceux qui 
la travaillent", the underlying implication being that it is the Caldoches who do so. But 
there are broussards who do accept the need for a change in this attitude, having realised 
that their continued wellbeing depends on good relations with their Melanesian 
neighbours. Roger Menesson, in his sixties, is a Gaullist landowner from Pouembout: 
On ne va tout de meme pas mettre 45,000 Kanaks en prison. Il faut leur reconnaitre 
une identite. 90% des blancs sont prets a voter une independance calooonienne. Le 
territoire va devenir un pays ... Il faudra bien se mettre un jour au tour d'une table avec 
les Kanaks.4 
Menesson's belief that 90% of the European population were ready for 
independence was not vindicated in the September 1987 self-determination referendum, 
but the need for dialogue with Melanesian independantistes following the events of 
1984-85 was eventually recognised by Jacques Lafleur and resulted in the 1988 
Matignon Accords. Whether they will lead to independence is unknown at this stage, 
and whether any real dialogue between broussards and Melanesians on a daily basis will 
become more widespread is also uncertain. Roger Menesson, having tried, admits that 
it is not easy. His example is far from being universal: "Moi, les Kanaks, je les cotoie 
depuis cinquante ans. J'ai dormi dans toutes les tribus avoisinantes et pourtant je ne 
peux pas dire que je les connais. "5 
Most broussards prefer to rest on their prejudices, claiming to know the ways 
of the Melanesians, while really knowing very little. As Guiart says: 
Chaque colon de brousse affirmera bien connaitre les noirs, les aimer meme, etre bien 
vu d'eux. Mais i1 pourra vivre toute sa vie aupres d'une concubine melanesienne sans 
conna1tre des evenements au village de sa campagne, parce qu'il n'imagine pas qu'il 
puisse s'y passer quelque chose d'inreressant. .. 6 
Melanesian loyalists 
The broussards are not the only Europeans with unclear perceptions of the 
Melanesian tribes of New Caledonia. As was indicated earlier in this essay,* outside 
commentators on New Caledonia also impose their preconceived notions on the local 
Melanesians. The simple bipolar image of "Melanesian separatists" facing "European 
1 Le Monde 4/5/88 p.44. 
2 BIPA: Chronology (White File) 16/12/84. 
3 Le Nouvel Observateur 21/12/84 p.29. 
4 Ibid. 27/9/85 p.27. 
5 Le Point 14/9/87 p.34. 
6 Guiart p.127. 
*See above p.l. 
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loyalists" is either spread without question by the press,1 or actively encouraged due to 
the ideological outlook of certain groups.2 The result is that Melanesian loyalists are 
disqualified by omission along with that much rarer breed; European independantistes. 
Claude Gabriel and Vincent Kermel number those Caldoches who vote for the FLNKS 
at approximately 1,500, with perhaps fifty actively involved in the party.3 The most 
common error resulting from this bipolar image is the consequent assumption that the 
FLNKS speaks on behalf of the entire Melanesian population when it cannot even claim 
to represent all Melanesian independantistes. Nidoi'sh Naisseline's LKS has never been 
a part of the FLNKS. Yann Celene Uregei's FULK was "excluded de facto from the 
FLNKS" in May 1989 following its decision to boycott the 11 June 1989 Provincial 
Elections. This incident was merely part of a wider rift over the FLNKS's signature of 
the Matignon Accords in June 1988, which FULK refused to sign.4 
Regardless of such internal differences, there are still those who cling to the 
image of Melanesian unity. Speaking in Noumea on May 41989 after the murder of the 
FLNKS President Jean-Marie Tjibaou by Djoubelly Wea, the French Prime Minister 
Michel Rocard glossed over the very cause of Tjibaou's death: divisions within Kanak 
pro-independence circles over Tjibaou's signature of the Matignon Accords on 26 June 
1988.5 FULK's refusal to sign the Accords was a symbol of its reluctance to accept 
Tjibaou's leadership. When that portion of the Melanesian community which votes for 
the RPCR and has never regarded Jean-Marie Tjibaou as its leader is also considered, it 
is clear that the "Kanak community" should not be supposed to be a politically united 
group. Only in 1989 did the Australasian press become aware of that fact regarding 
Kanak independantistes. 6 Australasian reporters remain less conscious of the presence 
of Melanesian loyalists who do not desire independence but prefer continued close ties 
with France. It is this often ignored group which will receive attention here. 
Melanesian loyalists are an ill-defined, contentious group within New 
Caledonian politics whose numbers vary according to the political stance of those 
describing them. In 1985, Doumenge boldly asserted that "Un tiers des autochtones 
semblent ( ... ) ne pas adherer aux theses du FLNKS."7 This percentage would include 
Melanesian loyalists, supporters of minority independence groups such as the LKS and 
those Melanesians who abstain from voting in elections. Whilst being plausible, 
Doumenge's figure of one third appears too neat and tidy to be based on sound 
statistics. Also, the number of Melanesians who differed from the "theses of the 
FLNKS" as a result of French patriotism rather than independantiste factionalism was 
not stated. For a staunch French republican like Patrick Paitel "la fierte de la plupart des 
Kanaks caledoniens a conserver la nationalite fran~aise"8 is unquestionable, as is the 
belief that only "deux ou trois pour cent de Caledoniens melanesiens fassent croire que 
la solution est socialiste et passe par l'independance. "9 For Gabriel and Kermel, men of 
the French extreme left, the exact opposite is the truth: the RPCR Senator Dick Ukeiwe 
is merely a token "Kanak de service"lO through whom the RPCR, "un parti «blanc»",ll 
is attempting to modify its image to give metropolitan France "une fausse vision de la 
realite coloniale fran~aise en Nouvelle-Caledonie et en la mystifiant sur I' existence d'un 
courant de bons Kanaks favorables au maintien du statu quo ,"12 For Paitel then, 
loyalist Melanesians form a majority while for Gabriel and Kermel they are merely a 
1 E.g. Christchurch Star 12/6/89 p.6. 
2 E.g. CORSO p.l. 
3 Gabriel and Kermel p.60. 
4 The Press 13/5/89 p.12. 
5 See NZ Listener 17/6/89 p.12. 
6 E.g. The Press: Kanak factionalism worsens 13/5/89 p.12; The Dominion Sunday Times 14/5/89. 
7 Doumenge: Les Melanesiens et la societe plurethnique en Nouvelle-Caledonie p.84. 
8 Patrick Paitel: L'enjeu kanak p.300. 
9 Ibid. p.295. 
10 Gabriel and Kermel p.208. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. p.211. 
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hoax invented by the RPCR. Such opinions should be regarded sceptically. Paitel 
inflates the importance of Melanesian loyalists merely to undermine the FLNKS's claim 
to electoral legitimacy, while Gabriel and Kermel desire to deflate the numbers and 
significance of Melanesian loyalists in order to undermine the RPCR's claim to being a 
multiracial party. 
For reliable information on the numbers of loyalist Melanesians, electoral results 
are more useful than such slanted opinions, but have their own inherent drawbacks. 
Electoral results do not offer breakdowns of voting according to ethnic group, except by 
default in communes like Mare, Lifou, and Ouvea in the Loyalty Islands where 97% of 
the population is Melanesian, and on the Isle of Pines where 92% of the population is 
also Melanesian.l Electoral results for these communes serve only as rough indications 
of levels of Melanesian support for loyalist parties. FLNKS boycotts and Melanesian 
abstentions undermine the accuracy of election results as indicators of Melanesian 
political sympathies. Those who abstain may not do so out of personal support for the 
FLNKS. FLNKS barricades and clan pressures can be just as persuasive in convincing 
Melanesians not to vote. 
In the November 1984 Territorial Elections, actively opposed by the FLNKS, 
support for the RPCR in the Loyalty Islands ranged from 8% (418 votes) on Lifou, 
Dick Ukeiwe's home island, through 10.9% (198 votes) on Ouvea, to 13% (402 votes) 
on Mare. Mare was the only island where an independantiste party gained significant 
support. Naisseline's LKS gained 30.3% of the vote there (928 votes). The abstention 
rate was 90.1% on Lifou, 84.9% on Ouvea, and 55.9% on Mare. On the Isle of Pines, 
the Melanesian loyalist vote totalled 19.4% of the electorate, with the RPCR receiving 
9.6% of the vote (66 votes). The PFL led by Fran9ois Neoere, at that time the 
Melanesian Secretary-General of the right-wing FN(NC), received 9.8% of the vote (68 
votes) there. The abstention rate on the Isle of Pines was 49.9%.2 One other Melanesian 
loyalist group also contested the elections; EPA, led by the former Melanesian RPCR 
Deputy from Lifou, Franck Wahuzue. It gained a total of 1,116 votes, or 2.4% of the 
Territorial electorate, indicative perhaps of a Melanesian loyalist preference for the 
greater following of the RPCR. 3 
In the September 1985 Regional Elections, actively contested by the FLNKS, 
the Melanesian loyalist vote on the outlying islands was even higher. The RPCR gained 
13.9% of the vote (504 votes) on Mare, 25.9% (1,594 votes) on Lifou, and 26.5% 
(542 votes) on Ouvea. Nonetheless, the depth of Melanesian support for independence 
parties was also shown. The FLNKS gained 34.2% of the vote (1,239 votes) on Mare, 
45.8% (2807 votes) on Lifou, and 42.1% (862 votes) on Ouvea. The LKS received 
30.6% of the vote on Mare (1110 votes), 9.4% (579 votes) on Lifou, and 8.7% on 
Ouvea (178 votes). Even so, abstentions are also worth noting. On Mare the abstention 
rate was 21.2% On Lifou it was 16.2% and on Ouvea 20%. Where the political 
sympathies of these Melanesian voters lay is unknown. On the Isle of Pines, 24.5% of 
the voters (184 votes) were in favour of the RPCR. The FLNKS had a support level of 
29.4% (221 votes), and the LKS 16.5% (124 votes). The abstention rate on the Isle of 
Pines was 21.2%.4 
The violent events on Ouvea in 1988 do not seem to have significantly shaken 
the level of Melanesian support for the RPCR in the Loyalty Islands. In the June 1989 
Territorial Elections, the RPCR gained a 33.98% level of support overall in the Loyalty 
Islands (2,892 votes). The FLNKS gained 45.97% there (3,912 votes) and the LKS 
16.93% (1,441 votes). The RPCR gained two seats out of seven in the Loyalty Islands, 
a small but stable minority.5 
1 Jean-Pierre Doumenge: Diversire ethno-culturelle et expression politique en Nouvelle-Caledonie in La 
Nouvelle- Cal6donie: Ia straregie. le droit et la Republigue, ed. A Poher et al. p.57. 
2 Op cit. Connell pp.326-7. 
3 Ibid. pp.321, 327. 
4 Ibid. p.362-3. 
5 Pacific Islands Monthly July 1989 p.24; Le Monde 13/6/89 p.9. 
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The September 1985 Regional Elections also saw the loyalist Melanesian party 
RPC contesting seats in the Northern Region of the Grande Terre. Led by Henri 
Wetta,l the RPC was aimed specifically at Melanesian voters who opposed the pro-
independence goals of the FLNKS, but who were not willing to vote for the largely 
European RPCR.2 The RPC attracted 8.5% of the vote in the Northern Region (1,058 
votes). By way of comparison, the RPCR gained 23.3% of the vote there (2,888 
votes).3 
The above selected figures indicate a level of Melanesian support for loyalist 
parties ranging from 8-26% of the Melanesian electorate in certain communes. The 
Melanesian loyalist vote in the 13 September 1987 self-determination referendum falls 
approximately midway between the extremes of that range, with 16.8% of the total 
Melanesian electorate in New Caledonia voting against independence at that time.4 This 
level of support is not great enough to justify Patrick Paitel's earlier assertion of a 
loyalist Melanesian majority, but nor is the number of Melanesian loyalist voters as 
marginal as Gabriel and Kermel would lead their readers to believe. Instead, Melanesian 
loyalists form a small but not insignificant electoral minority within the greater 
Melanesian electorate in New Caledonia. 
Melanesian loyalists may be subdivided into two groups. There are those, often 
tribal elders, who desire continued links with France on the basis of its support for their 
custom status within the tribal milieu. Others, usually Melanesians living within the 
European social environment of Noumea, support ties with the French Republic on the 
grounds of progress and modernity, arguing that the route to Melanesian prosperity lies 
with integration into the Territory's Western-style economy. Certain Melanesian 
loyalists combine elements of both of these viewpoints, particularly on the Loyalty 
Islands and the Isle of Pines. The lack of European settlement there in the nineteenth 
century resulted in land ownership not being the political issue it has been on the 
Grande Terre in the 1980s. The lack of a European presence has also allowed 
Melanesians on those islands to develop their own entrepreneurial activities. 
Investments such as those in tourism on the Isle of Pines give these Melanesians an 
incentive to support the Western-style economy and links with France whilst still living 
within a tribal environmentS The same belief in the importance of ties with France 
persists in those islanders who have "emigrated" from the Loyalty Islands to Noumea to 
work outside their tribal milieu. They form the Noumean support base for the 
Melanesian RPCR Senator Dick Ukeiwe, and Franck Wahuzue. 6 
On the Grande Terre, up country from Noumea, the appeal of French loyalism 
for rural Melanesians lies in the French Republic's recognition of tribal custom. The 
certainty of a continued custom role for conservative tribal elders and their followers 
within the French legal system remains the European community's strongest asset in 
appealing to the Melanesian rural minority which opposes the uncertain future implied 
by the independence goals of the FLNKS. For example, Prime Minister Chirac's 
administration actively appealed to Melanesian custom chiefs using this approach in an 
attempt to weaken support for the FLNKS boycott of the 13 September 1987 self-
determination referendum. Bernard Pons made a grand tour of the tribes stressing the 
advantages of remaining within the French Republic, and received a particularly warm 
welcome from the Tchamba and Nebouba tribes near Ponerihouen. Le Monde's reporter 
remarked that even there, Melanesian adolescents were notable by their absence from 
tribal welcoming committees.? 
1 Wetta was the mayor of the east coast centre of Poindimie and a former RPCR deputy, with the added 
distinction of being Jean-Marie Tjibaou's brother-in-law. Le Monde 2-8/8/88 p.25. 
2 Connell p.359. 
3 Ibid. p.363. 
4 Le Monde 16/9/87 p.9. 
5 Doumenge: Diversite ethno-culturelle,. p.57. 
6 Guiart p.272; Doumenge: Diversite ethno-culturelle ... p.57. 
7 Le Monde 7/2/87 p.6. 
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This may be indicative of a generation gap within the tribal milieu. On Ouvea, 
where tribal divisions exist between the loyalist Weneki tribe and the independantiste 
Gossana tribe over the issue of independence, young militants have deserted the loyalist 
beliefs of their parents. Amongst the Kanaks killed on Ouvea in May 1988 was Vincent 
Daoume, whose father is a custom chief and a prominent local RPCR leader. Also 
amongst the casualties was Martin Haewe, a stagiaire libyen who was also the son of 
an RPCR supporter.l Melanesian youths, having received a French education or spent 
time away from their tribes whilst working in Noumea, are less prepared than they were 
in the 1960s to accept the leadership of conservative elders. Such youths perceive 
conservative elders as being ignorant and backward whilst at the same time using 
custom to preserve their privileged social position. These youths are more susceptible to 
the independence goals of the FLNKS than their elders. 
For conservative tribal elders, their greatest reproach of young FLNKS militants 
is that they are ignorant of custom, that they have no respect for tribal tradition and are 
too Europeanised by Western socialism. The following remarks, made in 1983 by 
Lucien Paulin, grand chief of Ouatom-La Foa, bear all the signs of an old man 
entrenched on one side of a generation gap: 
On entend parler de clans, mais qui peut le faire avec exactitude, a part les vieux qui 
connaissent la coutume? Actuellement, les jeunes en parlent, mais qu'est-ce qu'ils en 
savent?2 
Felix Mandoue, grand chief of the Ba Nindia, Warai' and Houai1ou districts, is 
another elder who disapproves of independantistes on similar grounds. An action which 
reinforced his distrust was a decision made by FLNKS militants in 1984 to hold a 
political meeting at the foot of a banyan tree normally reserved for the adjucation of 
custom business.3 For Mandoue, such an action was typical of their lack of respect for 
tradition. For the FLNKS members responsible, the designated meeting place was no 
doubt aimed to give the gathering the added authority of a custom setting. 
Conservative tribal elders are not alone in their distrust of independantistes on 
the basis of custom. Urban Melanesian loyalists exhibit the same dislike, particularly 
those with some custom standing. They view FLNKS members as being inauthentic 
Kanaks due to their questioning of established authority, and assume they must be 
socially inferior to wish to do so. In 1983, Marco Waheo, then President of the MJCF, 
discounted the political credibility of independantiste leaders due to their reported lack of 
social standing within the tribal hierarchy: 
Pidjot, Machoro, Iekawe et compagnie ne sont pas des gens serieux. Coutumierement, 
ce sont des esclaves, c'est-a-dire des descendants de prisonniers des guerres tribales.4 
By European standards, Waheo's remarks sound extremely snobbish. It is 
impossible to imagine a metropolitan French Deputy publicly using this argument to 
discredit his or her opposition. Custom is a double-edged weapon though, and certain 
urban Melanesian loyalists use it against independantistes at their peril, considering that 
they too have adopted many Western perspectives whilst living in Noumea. In 1983 
Dick Ukeiwe said of Melanesian FI leaders: "Sur place, les hommes politiques 
melanesiens qui parlent de coutume, leaders du Front Independantiste ou conseillers 
occultes caches dans les bureaux administratifs, n'ont aucune existence coutumiere. "5 
The same might be argued of Dick Ukeiwe who, as an RPCR leader, was also spending 
considerable periods of time outside the tribal milieu in 1983. 
One example of the paradoxical thinking that can result is to be found in the 
1982 views of Jeannine Bouteille of the Melanesian Foundation of the AFC, affiliated to 
1 See Le Monde 26/5/88 p.17; 29/6/88 p.9. The phrase stagiaire libyen refers to the small and often-
cited group of FLNKS militants who spent time in Libya receiving training of an unspecified nature. 
2 Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes 7/1/83 op. cit. AFC p.159. 
3 Le Nouvel Observateur 28/12/84 p.34. 
4 Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes 7/1/83 op. cit. AFC p.167. 
5 Ibid. 8/12/83 op. cit. AFC p.100. 
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the RPCR. While accusing FI members of being ignorant of custom and " ... manipules 
par des meneurs politiques marxistes-racistes", she herself employed some very 
untraditional thinking. Her assumptions about rural Kanaks match those of Ton ton and 
Joel Pierrot of Bourail surprisingly well.* Like Joel Pierrot ("La terre a ceux qui la 
travaillent."), Mme. Bouteille saw no justification for the FI's aims of increasing the 
size of tribal reserves through land claims. For her there was no need because "aucun 
jeune ne veut plus travailler pour la communaute". The communal ownership and 
working of land, one of the cornerstones of Melanesian custom, should be abandoned 
in favour of private land tenure for young Melanesians. This would encourage an 
individualistic work ethic amongst them.l The reactions of grand chiefs like Felix 
Mandoue and Lucien Paulin to such a statement can only be imagined, but it is doubtful 
they would be positive. 
Herein lies the fundamental problem for the two groups within the Melanesian 
loyalist segment of New Caledonia's population: the reconciliation of Melanesian 
tradition with European modernity. The same issue similarly arises amongst Melanesian 
independantistes. The support of rural Melanesian conservatives for ties with France 
rests on the perception that the French Republic entrenches their custom authority and 
upholds tribal tradition. For an urban Melanesian loyalist like Mme. Bouteille, despite 
her labelling of Melanesian independantistes as being ignorant of custom, she too has 
been Europeanised to the extent of rejecting fundamental tenets of Melanesian tribal life 
such as collective ownership of land in favour of Western individualist economic 
principles. For her, ties with France are more significant in terms of modernity than 
tradition. European economic values and methods offer Melanesians a means of self-
improvement and contact with the twentieth century. The future of the Melanesian 
community is "vivre en paix dans le modernisme avec la France ... " rather than the 
prospect of " ... bien vivre dans la misere avec l'Independance "Kanake" Socialiste geree 
par une nation etrangere raciste."2 For her, like Caldoche and metropolitan French 
conservatives,3 Melanesian independence is synonymous with backwardness. 
Dick Ukeiwe, RPCR Senator for New Caledonia and the figurehead of the 
Melanesian loyalists, has an outlook on the future of Melanesians in New Caledonia 
which mixes elements of both the modern and the traditional. Section three of his 
"Ukeiwe Project", presented on 24 January 1985 to President Mitterrand, envisaged the 
recognition of "une sorte de Senat coutumier a l'echelle du territoire afin d'aboutir a une 
«assemblee des sages», avec un large pouvoir consultatif. "4 In 1984, Franck 
Wahuzue's EPA also held the recognition of a similar conseil des grands chefs as a 
central part of its programme.s The text of the 26 June 1988 Matignon Accords 
recognised similar, but less far-reaching provincial bodies: 
1. (e) Les organismes consultatifs; le conseil consultatif coutumier provincial 
regroupe les grands chefs des aires coutumieres de la province. 11 est consulte par le 
conseil de province sur les projets ou propositions de deliberations portant sur les 
questions de droit civil particulier et de droit foncier. 11 peut etre consulte sur toute 
autre matiere a !'initiative du president de la province. A son initiative, i1 peut saisir le 
conseil de province de toute question ou proposition concernant le statut de droit civil 
particulier et le statut des reserves foncieres melanesiennes. 6 
Alongside Dick Ukeiwe's support for the enshrinement of custom law within 
French Republican law coexists a belief in European values. In 1983 he made public his 
belief that the power of tribal ties is declining for the Melanesian inhabitants of N oumea 
* See above p.16. 
1 AFC p.146. 
2 Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes 19/10/82 op. cit. AFC p.150. 
3 Claude Martinez in La Nouvelle-Caledonie: la strategie. le droit et la Republique ed. A. Poher et al. 
p.194; Paitel p.291; Jacques Lafleur in Le Monde 6-7/1/85 p.1; cf. below p.37. 
4 Le Monde 26/1/85 p.10. 
5 Connell p.321. 
6 BIPA. Yellow File 882014206. 
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and its environs "( ... qui) abritent actuellement quelque 30,000 Melanesiens et 4,000 
families y sont proprietaires de leur terrain et de leur maison. Pour nous la tribu ne 
constitue plus qu'une reference sentimentale. "1 Here, Ukeiwe's emphasis is on the 
future prospect of each Melanesian family owning its own house and section of land. 
To what extent the 21% of New Caledonia's Melanesian population who live in 
Noumea's urban environment2 share similar aspirations is open to speculation. For 
those Melanesians who are unemployed, working in temporary jobs or in minor posts 
in the SLN and who are living in substandard or temporary accommodation, links with 
their tribes and the opportunity to return to them assume greater importance than for that 
small (but statistically unquantified) affluent group of Melanesians with well-paid, 
steady work in the civil service, the RPCR, or in commercial posts. Connell indicated in 
1987 that it was the latter select group, most ably prepared to lead the Melanesian 
community into a state of greater autonomy, which was the least likely to actually do so 
given its privileged status within Caldoche society and its acceptance of its values.3 
Under the Matignon Accords, which allow for regional development and encourage the 
greater participation of Melanesians in the Territorial administration,4 that Westernised 
Melanesian minority is likely to expand. FLNKS leaders within the Territorial 
administration who experience the material benefits of the Matignon Accords may use 
them to further their independence goals, or may decide that working within the French 
administration beyond 1998 is a not altogether unpleasant prospect. 5 
Non-European immigrants - not all loyalists 
If information on Melanesian loyalism is scarce and Melanesian loyalists are 
frequently overlooked in examinations of New Caledonia's political life, this applies to 
an even greater degree when searching for concrete details on the political views of New 
Caledonia's non-European immigrant population. Numbering 29,524 inhabitants and 
forming 20.3% of the total population according to the 1983 ITSEE census,* this 
diverse group confounds even further the simple bipolar Melanesian independantiste 
versus European loyalist analysis of New Caledonian politics. Amongst this 20.3% of 
New Caledonia's population, the 1983 ITSEE census listed the presence of 12,174 
Wallisians and Futunans (8.5% of the population), 5,570 French Polynesians (3.8%), 
2,381 Vietnamese (1.6%), 5,319 Indonesians (3.7%), 1,212 Ni-Vanuatu Melanesians 
(0.8%), and 2,868 "others" (2%).6 
For the Caldoches, the presence of the different groups which form New 
Caledonia's non-European immigrant population is the product of a tolerant, multi-racial 
society in action. In 1980 Brou held up the example of Vietnamese, Tahitians, 
Wallisians, Indonesians and a range of others mixing and co-existing peaceably in the 
streets of Noumea, free of racial prejudice: 
La sortie des cinemas et le public des stades offrent des tableaux tres varies de la 
societe pluriethnique de Nouvelle-Caledonie, et I' on constate facilement que le racisme 
n'existe pas dans ce pays.? 
A sweeping statement indeed. That people sit together in theatres and stadiums 
or walk along the same streets in Noumea should not be thought to imply that racism 
does not exist there. Nor should Noumea be considered as representative of the entire 
1 Op. cit. Cercle KATARA: Melanesiens de demain? p.32. 
2 Pascal Gantelet et al. (eds.): Tableaux de l'economie caledonienne p.32. 
3 Connell: Melanesian Nationalism in New Caledonia: Essays on Nationalism and Dependency eds. M. 
Spencer, A. Ward and J. Connell p.241. 
4 See BIPA Yellow File 882014205. 
5 There are accusations within the FLNKS that UC leaders are becoming preoccupied with personal 
material gain to the detriment of future independence goals. See Le Monde 5-6/11/89 p.7. 
* Cf. above p.3. 
6 Op. cit. Connell p.222 
7 Brou p.19. 
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Territory, for the variety of ethnic groups living there is the exception rather than the 
rule. The 1983 ITSEE census concluded that 90% of all Wallisians in New Caledonia 
were inhabitants of greater Noumea, 88% of French Polynesians, 96% of Vietnamese, 
and 76% of all Indonesians, to name but four examples.! Those non-European 
immigrants not residing in Noumea are predominantly distributed around the Southern 
Province of the Grande Terre, the only Province where the RPCR holds an electoral 
majority.2 Geographically, if not necessarily politically, they are very much a part of 
Caldochie. 
There is not a wealth of detailed evidence available on the voting patterns of 
these groups. A discussion of their histories and immigration patterns is not possible 
here and is available in detail elsewhere.3 Instead, just four groups who display 
differing levels of political commitment to French loyalism will be briefly discussed. 
Firstly, the two main components of New Caledonia's Polynesian population, namely 
Wallis and Futuna Islanders, and French Polynesians. Secondly the two main groups 
who form New Caledonia's Asian community; those of Vietnamese and Indonesian 
origin. Evidence of the political views of even these selected groups is flimsy and 
incomplete, with a dearth of sources from which to draw sound conclusions. In the 
past, it has been concluded that generally non-European immigrant communities vote en 
masse for loyalist parties, mainly the RPCR.4 Besset indicates that the economic well-
being of these immigrants lies in New Caledonia's Western economy, upon which their 
future in the Territory is dependent. As a result, they are wary of living in an 
independent Kanaky: 
Meme si les conditions dans lesquelles ils vivent sont loin d'etre enviables, ils les 
preferent au saut dans l'inconnu que constituerait le changement de souverainete.s 
Given past statements by the FLNKS that recent non-European immigrants do 
not fulfil the FLNKS's "victims of history" criteria for electoral eligibilty, or future 
residency in Kanaky, this is scarcely surprising.6 When non-European immigrants are 
mentioned by Melanesian independantistes, their descriptions are somewhat less 
glowing than Brou's. For independantistes such immigrants, rather than being proof of 
New Caledonia as a multi-racial society, have been regarded as intruders introduced by 
Caldoche politicians and/or the Paris government to flood New Caledonia with cheap 
labour and erode the local Melanesian demographic majority, thus tipping the electoral 
balance further in favour of the Caldoche community. Suzanne Ounei, an FLNKS 
activist, describes immigrants in general as the scum of the earth .7 More specifically, 
of non-European immigrants she has said: "They used these people against us [the 
Kanaks] by giving them our jobs."8 
Of these ethnic groups, for local Melanesians the greatest enmity is reserved for 
Wallis and Futuna Islanders. Since their influx at the time of New Caledonia's nickel 
boom from the late 1960s, considerable racial tension has existed between Melanesians 
and these Polynesian immigrants. The permanent settlement of these islanders, 
reinforced by the fact that their numbers in New Caledonia are now greater than in their 
home islands,9 has been an important cause of this tension. For example, in mid-1980, 
the Territorial administration proposed the reallocation of an estate near Dumbea to 
Wallis Islanders for settlement. Madame Roch Pidjot led an FI campaign against this 
decision and claimed the land in question for various dispossessed clans. The 
administration eventually abandoned the reallocation amidst rising racial hostility 
1 Op. cit. Pascal Gantelet et al (eds.): Tableaux de l'economie calooonienne p.32. 
2 See Connell p.222. 
3 See Brou: Peuplement et population.": Connell: New Caledonia or Kanaky? 
4 Domoy p.59; Connell p.239, p.272. 
5 Besset p.68. 
6 E.g. J-M Tjibaou in Le Monde 25/1/85 p.6. Cf. above p.8. 
7 Suzanne Ounei: For Kanak Independence: the fight against French rule in New Caledonia p.1 0. 
8 Ounei: public discussion 18/4/89. 
9 Domoy p.73. 
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betweens Kanaks and Wallisians, which peaked with a sizeable street brawl during 
Noumea's 1980 grande braderie .1 
Guiart has gone so far as to suggest this incident was part of a larger plan by the 
Territorial administration to use Wallisian settlements as "barriers" against Melanesians. 
He cites the establishment of Wallisians in lots around the outskirts of Noumea, the 
building of a W allisian village at Thio on land claimed by Melanesians, and their 
settlement at Houailou adjacent to the Nedivin tribe, as other examples of the 
provocative strategic location of Wallisians.2 Whether this is really some conscious 
plot, or merely the result of thoughtless planning in action is open to question, but such 
settlements are undeniable sources of tension. Along with those Caldoches who fled 
Thio in 1985 following Eloi Machoro's occupation of the centre were an uncounted 
number of Wallisians who were not enthusiastic about the prospect of remaining with 
the FLNKS militants roaming the area.* 
Wallisians and Futunans have in the past been stereotyped by Melanesian 
independantistes as being easily led by the Caldoches. Their employment in the 1980s 
as bodyguards and in the front-line of anti-independence demonstrations by the RPCR 
has done much to confirm this reputation. However, Wallisian participation in loyalist 
party politics extends deeper than these activities. Caldoche conservative parties sought 
Wallisian support as far back as the early 1970s. In 1972 EDS and the MLC assisted 
New Caledonia's first two Wallisian representatives into the Territorial Assembly) 
Since then, with the exception of ETE, a loyalist party aimed specifically at non-
European minority groups between 1976 and 1978,4 Wallisians have predominantly 
followed conservative Caldoche parties, the most important of which has been the 
RPCR since its formation in 1978. 
Since the mid-1980s though, there have been indications that Wallisians and 
Futunans are increasingly searching for their own political voice, a search which has 
involved a drift away from strict adherence to the RPCR. The first sign of differences 
between the RPCR and its Wallisian supporters came in 1982 when Petelo Manuofiua, 
the RPCR's only Wallisian representative, resigned from the party to become an 
independentS Then UMF was formed for the March 1983 Municipal Elections.6 In 
November 1984 UMF contested the November Territorial Elections. Led by Kalepo 
Muliava,t the party aimed to serve Wallis and Futuna Islanders more comprehensively 
than the RPCR had done prior to that stage whilst still adhering to loyalist principles. 7 
UMF placed candidates only in Noumea and the Southern Region of the Grande Terre, 
where its demographic support base was concentrated. It gained a mere 566 votes 
(1.4% of the total electorate).s At that time, Wallis and Futuna Islanders still preferred 
the broader electoral appeal of the RPCR. 
That situation changed remarkably in 1989 when the UO participated in the 11 
June Provincial Elections. Although led by the same Kalepo Muliava, the UO was much 
more radical in outlook than UMF in that the party did not seek to align itself with the 
RPCR's loyalist goals. Instead, Kalepo Muliava proclaimed the UO's "cousinage 
culture! avec les Canaques", which led the RPCR to accuse the UO of having a "ton 
d'extreme droite, par son caractere racia1."9 Muliava was just as critical of the RPCR, 
attacking the party's electoral clientelism of Wallisians through its patronage of 
1 Alan Ward: Land and politics in New Caledonia pp.56-57. 
2 Guiart pp.281-282. 
* Cf. above p.12. 
3 Domoy p.60. 
4 Ibid. p.66. 
5 Connell p.300. 
6 Ibid. p.307. 
t Muliava died aged 51 on 12 August 1989. See Le Monde 15/8/89 p.16. 
7 Connell p.322. 
8 Op. cit. ibid. p.327. 
9 Le Monde 10/6/89 p.14. 
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Wallisian custom authority, and its use of unemployed Wallisian youths as RPCR 
bodyguards. He also stated that under the tutelage of the RPCR the Wallisian and 
Futunan community "n'a pas avance d'un pouce depuis dix ans. Nous sommes aussi 
marginalises que les Canaques." With a W allisian unemployment rate of 50%, and only 
two Wallisians in the Territorial administration, Muliava's faith in the RPCR had 
dissipated.! His views were not merely held in isolation. In the June 1988 Provincial 
Elections, the UO won two out of 32 seats in the Southern Province.2 The UO's total 
support was 2,429 votes or 6.19% of the Southern electorate) Wallis and Futuna 
Islanders have now gained their own independent political voice in New Caledonia, and 
have begun to dispel their stereotype as unthinking followers of RPCR conservatism. 
The second largest community of South Pacific immigrants in New Caledonia 
consists of French Polynesians, 88% of whom live in Noumea.4 They are the only 
immigrant community whose population declined following the nickel boom of the early 
1970s. Unlike other immigrant groups, who preferred to stay on in New Caledonia for 
want of better prospects in their homelands, French Polynesians have not displayed the 
same reluctance. Between 1976 and 1983, their numbers in New Caledonia declined 
1.7% per annum, falling from 6,391 inhabitants in 1976 to 5,570 inhabitants in 1983.5 
With this decline in confidence in life in New Caledonia, it might be expected 
that French Polynesian confidence in the RPCR also declined. Dornoy has asserted that 
the majority of French Polynesians in New Caledonia favour autonomy,6 yet evidence 
of this is not abundant. Admittedly, the French Polynesian loyalist party ETP which 
contested the November 1984 Territorial Elections was not notable for its high level of 
support by Noumean French Polynesians, receiving a mere 269 votes (0.7% of the total 
electorate).? Conversely though, it is unclear just how many French Polynesians vote 
for the FLNKS. It is worth noting that no successful French Polynesian party with 
similar goals to the UO has arrived on the New Caledonian political scene. Precisely 
where the support of the majority of the French Polynesian electorate does lie is unclear. 
Although living predominantly within the confines of the loyalist-dominated Southern 
Province, French Polynesian attitudes to its politics remain undefined. 
Even more obscure is the question of the political stance(s) of New Caledonia's 
Asian community in the late 1980s. Unlike the 1950s when, for example, the 
Vietnamese community in New Caledonia was caught in the centre of a political incident 
with regard to Vietnam's independence from France and incurred the hostility of 
Caldoche conservatives,& in the 1980s, evidence of any form of Asian politicial 
expression in New Caledonia has been singularly lacking. Connell concludes this is a 
result of the past harrassment the Vietnamese and other Asians have experienced at the 
hands of the Caldoches. Such harrassment is assumed to have produced in Asians a 
great reluctance to become actively involved in politics.9 Another possible reason for 
this lack of a distinct Asian political viewpoint is the degree to which Asians have 
become assimilated into the wider Caldoche community. Dornoy contends that the 
Vietnamese community is generally uninvolved in politics, but is predominantly 
loyalist.IO Following Vietnam's unification under Communist rule in 1975, few if any 
of New Caledonia's inhabitants of Vietnamese origin would ever contemplate returning 
there. Indeed, around 500 Vietnamese refugees born in New Caledonia prior to the 
1950s who returned to Vietnam following the French withdrawal in 1954 subsequently 
re-migrated to New Caledonia after the 1975 North Vietnamese invasion of South 
1 Le Monde 10/6/89 p.14. 
2 Pacific Islands Monthly July 1989 p.24. 
3 Le Monde 13/6/89 p.9. 
4 See below p.28. 
5 Op. cit. Christnacht p.26. 
6 Dornoy p.78. 
7 Op. cit. Connell p.327. 
8 Domoy pp.45-48. 
9 Connell p.221. 
10 Domoy p.80. 
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Vietnam.l Like those inhabitants of Vietnamese origin who remained in New Caledonia 
during the 1950s and 1960s, they have overwhelmingly adopted French citizenship and 
see no future in a return to Vietnam. For that reason they support the RPCR electorally, 
yet are not noteworthy for their presence in the party's hierarchy. 
The second major component of New Caledonia's Asian community, those of 
Indonesian origin, are even more of a silent minority. Like New Caledonia's inhabitants 
of Vietnamese origin, they are unwilling to leave New Caledonia and in their silence 
have lent electoral support to the RPCR. Concerning the Indonesian community's 
current political beliefs, little else can be said.2 
From this brief, and in places scanty, overview, it is now clear that few 
substantial supportable claims can be made about the political views of the diverse 
ethnic groups which form New Caledonia's non-European immigrant population. 
Although an undefined number of them are electorally committed to French loyalism, 
the depth of this commitment varies from the silent support of the RPCR in the Asian 
community, through to the formation of fledgling loyalist political parties by immigrant 
Polynesians. The entry of the Wallisian UO into New Caledonian politics in 1989 
displays that New Caledonia's non-European immigrants are not as rigidly loyalist as 
was once believed and that they are only prepared to support the RPCR as long as they 
feel that the party represents their future interests. 
1 Connell p.221. 
2 Ibid. p.220. 
Chapter Two - loyalist party politics 
Foreword: personality politics and ideological 
considerations 
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Chapter One discussed the identities of the diverse groups within New 
Caledonia's loyalists. Chapter Two is concerned with the expression of loyalist views 
in the political arena. For a Territory with a population of less than 150,000,* party 
politics in New Caledonia involves a comparitively large number of different political 
groups which often last little more than a few months before disbanding. The June 1989 
Provincial Elections alone involved thirteen parties canvassing votes from an electorate 
of only 91,259.1 In 1989, the oldest and largest of New Caledonia's conservative 
parties, the RPCR, was a mere eleven years old. The oldest parties of the extreme right 
are even more recent arrivals: the FC was founded only in 1982, while the FN(NC) 
began in 1984. The smallest of New Caledonia's political groupings are usually less the 
expression of a conservative current within New Caledonian politics than a vehicle for 
the views of an outspoken individual. Justin Guillemard furnishes a good example, 
being the motive force behind RURALE, the early FC and later the CAP, all of which 
will be discussed in more detail below. Fran9ois Neoere's VFVF, a Melanesian loyalist 
party formed for the March 1986 French Elections,2 and Kalepo Muliava's UMF are 
other examples of small, short-lived parties held together by forceful individuals. 
On a political scene as small as New Caledonia's, personality is almost 
invariably as strong an element as ideology. Personality differences within party ranks 
are frequently the cause of the individual shifts in party adherence which occur in New 
Caledonian politics.3 Certain high-ranking RPCR officials began their political careers 
in the UC, now the largest party within the FLNKS. Dick Ukeiwe is the most notable 
example, having left the UC in 1960. Such a change in political alignment in the 
relatively distant past is less radical than those switches made by other individuals 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Roger Galliot for instance began his political career with 
the UC, shifted to the centrist FNSC, then moved to the more conservative RPCR 
before joining the extreme right-wing FN(NC).4 An even more extreme example of 
political fence-jumping is to be found in Fran9ois Neoere's political career. In the space 
of just five years, he transformed himself from being an independantiste FI electoral 
candidate in 1979 into the Secretary-General of the extreme right-wing FN(NC) by 
* See above p.3. 
1 Le Monde 13/6/89 p.9. 
2 Connell p.370. 
3 Domoy p.260. 
4 Gabriel and Kermel pp.108-109. 
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1984.1 Franck Wahuzue, a member of the independantiste Foulards rouges in the late 
1960s was a prominent representative of the RPCR by the mid-1980s, which he 
reportedly left due to Lafleur's "colonial" outlook. He reverted to being a moderate 
independantiste by the late 1980s.2 
Other examples of this sort of political shift in allegiance abound in New 
Caledonian politics and serve to undermine rigidly doctrinaire ideological analyses 
which split New Caledonian politics into two mutually exclusive camps opposed over 
the issue of independence.3 Consider for example the members of the Lapetite family 
who were responsible for the death of 10 FLNKS members in the Hienghene massacre 
on 5 December 1984. The Lapetites were labelled by Ounei as "a group of fascists" and 
by Guiart as "illettres secondaires veritablement a demi sauvages ... ".4 These left-wing 
stereotypes do not accord with the Lapetites' reputation amongst Hienghene's 
inhabitants for being encanaque. Raoul Lapetite had a Melanesian mother.s In 1942 at 
the age of 17 he was instrumental in preventing a broussard vigilante group from 
lynching a gang of Melanesian labourers after one of them murdered a Caldoche 
foreman. The incident was known as "!'affaire Bouye".6 Raoul Lapetite and his sons 
were considered to have better relations with local Melanesians than with Hienghene's 
European inhabitants. Two of the Melanesians killed in the Hienghene ambush, 
Auguste and Alphonse Wathea, were family friends of the Lapetites, with whom they 
regularly went hunting.? Jean-Claude Lapetite was a member of PALIKA, an 
independantiste party for whom he stood as an electoral candidate in 1982, and was 
involved with the FI/FLNKS up to the occurrence of the ambush in December 1984.8 
Any examination of New Caledonian politics which relies solely on ideological 
dogmatism and ignores the whims of human personality will inevitably fall short of 
explaining such connections, for they do not necessarily have purely ideological 
explanations. 
The RPCR - "un front de refus"? 
The RPCR is the largest conservative party in New Caledonia. Like the FLNKS 
it is a varied coalition. On its formation in 1978, the RPCR combined diverse 
conservative political tendencies and interest groups: Gaullists, Giscardians, 
Chiraquians, Republicans, Departmentalists, broussards and Noumean businessmen as 
well as the different ethnic groups discussed in Chapter One. Besset indicates that such 
distinctions are still prominent within the party a decade after its formation.9 Coulon 
believes that these varied interest groups within the RPCR are united on only two 
points: opposition to Kanak independence and the support of European-dominated 
capitalism within the Territory.lO Even the second of these two points is open to 
question. Coulon himself mentioned in 1985 the division over economic issues existing 
within the RPCR between Justin Guillemard and Noumean business interests.11 
Considering such differences it cannot be categorically asserted that the RPCR has been 
united even on economic matters. 
1 Connell p.323. 
2 Le Nouvel Observateur 13-19/5/88 p.42; Le Point 4n/88 p.30. 
3 Cf. Michael Spencer who makes a pertinent point concerning New Caledonia with his suggestion that 
"it's not all black and white". See Spencer: "It's not all black and white" , ch.9 of New Caledonia: 
Essays in Nationalism and Dependency eds. Spencer et al. 
4 Ounei p.ll; Guiart p.XI. 
5 Duroy p.127. 
6 Ibid. p.141. 
7 Ibid. p.31. 
8 Ibid. p.223. 
9 Besset p.42. 
10 Coulon p.148. 
11 Ibid. cf. above p.13. 
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That leaves just one of Coulon's criteria upon which there has reportedly been 
unanimous agreement within the RPCR: opposition to Kanak independence. In its early 
years, the RPCR's rejection of independence overrode other in-depth policy 
considerations, leaving the party with very little in the way of clearly stated policy. The 
RPCR waited four years after its formation in 1978 before holding its first party 
conference. Connell notes that as late as 1982, the RPCR was "unused to doing 
[anything] other than reacting", and it had not formulated social and economic policies 
beyond its unconditional support for continued association with the French Republic.l 
Besset commented in 1988 that the RPCR still "ne constitue rien d'autre qu'un front de 
refus."2 
Evidence is abundant of the RPCR's past refusal to accept the independence 
claims of the FI and, from 1984, of the FLNKS. Public rejections of Melanesian 
independence claims by RPCR leaders reached their greatest level of vehemence in the 
mid-1980s when political tensions were particularly high. In 1984 Jacques Lafleur 
made some blunt statements with regard to the FLNKS's goals: 
Je suis persuade que le FI..NKS a une idee raciste, marxiste, canaque, haineuse. Mes 
convictions sont que ce pays n'a aucune envie de devenir independant et que ce n'est 
pas son interet, et que ce n'est pas celui de la France.3 
S'il s'agit de rendre la Nouvelle-Caledonie independante, je dis que c'est une 
couillonnade monstreuse ... l'independance de la Nouvelle-Cald6donie est une stupidite!4 
Roger Laroque, noted for his hard-line views, demonstrated no tolerance for the 
FLNKS at all. He stated shortly before his death in 1985 that "le FLNKS est une 
organisation qui n'a pas le droit d'exister. "5 Associated with such views was an 
outright rejection of any of the political assertions of the independantistes. Given the 
attitudes of the RPCR's leaders,* any possibility of successful dialogue with the 
FI/FLNKS was remote during the mid-1980s. The July 1983 Nainville-les-Roches 
negotiations concluded with an RPCR refusal to sign the declaration resulting from the 
conference partly due to its recognition of the need to abolish the "fait colonial" in New 
Caledonia.6 For Roger Laroque in 1983, New Caledonia's "fait colonial", the French 
left's term for describing New Caledonia's political and social inheritance from the 19th 
century, was simply nonsense.? For him, New Caledonia's "fait colonial" was "ce qui 
n'a jamais ete ici autre chose qu'un traite de protectorat conclu pacifiquement, sans tirer 
un coup de fusil, entre Europeens et Melanesiens afin de mettre fin aux guerres tribales 
et aux famines qui decimaient alors les "premiers occupants" et les menavaient 
d'extinction". 8 With his belief in such a benevolent colonial past it is scarcely surprising 
that Laroque saw no need for the existence of the Fl. His words indicate the ideological 
gulf that existed between RPCR leaders and their FLNKS counterparts at that time. 
Very little basis for mutual understanding existed between the two parties at the 
1983 Nainville-les-Roches meetings, as Lafleur himself retold: "A Nainville-les-
Roches, enjuillet 1983, j'ai ete estomaque quand Yeiwene Yeiwene m'a dit: «Vous, on 
vous accepte parce que vous etes une victime d'histoire!» Je ne me sens pas une victime 
de histoire! Je ne rougis pas d'etre fran9ais. "9 When Lafleur's personal fortune of 
1 Connell p.301. 
2 Besset p.42. 
3 Le Monde 18/11/84 p.10. 
4 Ibid. 6-7/1/85 p.l. 
5 Ibid. 21-22/4/85 p.9. 
*And of course the increasingly militant attitutes of the FI/FLNKS. 
6 Connell p.310. See Duroy p.206 for the full text. 
7 "Fait colonial" amongst other things signifies racial discrimination and unequal land distribution 
within New Caledonia. See Jacques Brunhes (a French PC deputy) for a typical definition in BIPA 
Yellow File 00607885300350. 
8 Le Corail September 1983 op. cit. AFC p.83. Concerning "premiers occupants" see above pp.9-10. 
9 Le Monde 6-7/1/85 p.l. 
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82,500,000 metropolitan francs is considered alongside his patriotism, one can see his 
point. I Yet such an anecdote also demonstrated the RPCR leader's scepticism regarding 
the FLNKS's ideological definitions. 
The RPCR "front de refus" mentioned by Besset has not only been directed at 
Melanesian independantistes in the past. Another salient trait unifying the diverse 
groups within the RPCR has been their distrust of the metropolitan French 
government.* The RPCR's "front de refus" against Kanak independence has in past 
years also been directed at successive metropolitan administrations. Since Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing's Presidency in the 1970s, the party has repeatedly opposed 
reformist plans by metropolitan French governments of both the left and right. Giscard 
d'Estaing's enthusiasm for the Dijoud Plan during his July 1979 visit to the Territory 
was not greeted with support from the RPCR. The RPCR opposed the Plan's proposed 
land reforms, and was likewise hostile when Paul Dijoud suggested further land 
reforms in 1980.2 
Similar opposition greeted the Lemoine Statute, formulated under the Mitterrand 
administration in 1983 by Georges Lemoine, the Secretary of State for DOM-TOM. 
During the Statute's formulation and after its adoption by the National Assembly, the 
RPCR refused to engage in any dialogue concerning the Statute, or to recognise the 
Statute's proposals for internal autonomy and a proposed referendum on independence 
in 1989.3 Jacques Lafleur condemned the Statute outright, claiming the PS was in 
league with the FI to lead New Caledonia into independence.4 Dick Ukeiwe summed up 
conservative fears that the Statute would lead New Caledonia into disaster: 
Qu'entendez-vous par statut evolutif et de transition [le statut Lemoine]? Evolutif vers 
quoi? L'anarchie politique? La politique des petits copains? Le malheur de Ia 
Nouvelle-Caledonie et ses habitants? L'effondrement economique et social? De 
transition? A nouveau, je vous demande vers quoi? La guerre civile ? La domination 
assuree des anglo-saxons ou pire encore des pays de lEst, de Cuba? 5 
For all Ukeiwe's fears that New Caledonia would be led into disaster, the FI 
proved to be equally hostile to the Lemoine Statute, claiming its schedule for a 
referendum was too slow and should be advanced to 1985. The Mitterrand 
administration, as events unfolded in 1984, found itself clinging to a statute which 
neither of the two main parties in New Caledonia desired. 6 
In 1985 the Mitterrand government found itself openly rejected again by the 
RPCR over its support for the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute. Edgard Pisani, the 
Socialist government's delegate to New Caledonia in 1984 and High Commissioner 
from 4 December 1984 became a major source of antagonism for the RPCR. His 
January 1985 proposal for New Caledonian independence in association with France 
was opposed by the RPCR on the grounds that it, like the Lemoine Statute, would pave 
the way to full independence.? Dick Ukeiwe had stated the party's opposition to any 
such plan in 1983: 
Politiquement, nous [le RPCR] ne voulons d'aucun statut qui... nous conduirait a 
l'independance ... Nous sommes done, nous l'avons toujours ete, contre tout statut 
d'autonomie politique transitoire, escalier de l'independance.s 
1 Le Monde 20/10/88 p.10. 
* Cf. above p.6. 
2 Connell p.281. Dijoud was then the Secretary of State to DOM-TOM. 
3 Ibid. p.311. 
4 BIPA White File 29/5/84. 
5 Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes 8/12/83 op. cit. AFC p.101 (original italics). 
6 Connell p.334. 
7 Ibid. p.338. 
8 Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes 5/10/83 op. cit. AFC p.54. 
31 
The Pisani Plan as it was known was later largely integrated into the 
Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute, along with parts of the Lemoine Statute. The RPCR's 
April 1985 Conference rejected the electoral division of New Caledonia into four 
Regions due to the certainty that the minority FLNKS was assured electoral 
predominance in at least two of those Regions, the Loyalty Islands and the North. The 
majority RPCR would hold electoral predominance in the South alone, with only the 
Central Region as an electorally marginal area. Lafleur accused Fabius of 
gerrymandering in favour of the FLNKS because the South with 85,100 inhabitants 
(59% of the Territory's population) was to be represented by only 18 seats. The other 
three Regions, with a total of only 61,000 inhabitants (45% of the population) were to 
be represented by 25 seats.l Ukeiwe criticised the new electoral plan as "une minorite 
d'electeurs [avec] une majorite de sieges."2 
The election of the Chirac administration in 1986 marked the beginning of a new 
period of relations between the RPCR and the metropolitan French government. For 
the RPCR, the new Prime Minister Jacques Chirac was, as the leader of the RPR, a 
more acceptable head of government than a PS representative. The RPCR enjoyed 
privileged links with the RPR: Jacques Lafleur and Maurice Nenou represented the 
RPCR's interests as RPR Deputies in the French National Assembly. Yet noticeable 
points of discord between the RPCR and the French government still existed under 
Chirac's administration. Bernard Pons, the RPR's spokesman for New Caledonia from 
12 December 1984, was appointed as the new Minister of DOM-TOM on 1 April 
1986.3 He later commented that his relations with the RPCR were not harmonious: 
J'ai trouve en face de moi un RPCR dur et determine qui ne souhaitait faire aucune 
concession a Ia minorite independantiste ... Qu'est-ce que je n'ai pas entendu de Ia part 
du RPCRI II considerait que je faisais Ia part trop belle au FLNKS.4 
Within weeks of his appointment as Minister, Pons was facing RPCR 
opposition. The first incident occurred on 29 April1986 when the RPCR rejected Pons' 
Territorial budget because it allocated allegedly excessive funding to the Regions 
administered by FLNKS representatives. 5 The RPCR also expressed dissatisfaction 
over Pons' decision to remove certain executive powers from the Territorial Congress 
and concentrate them with the High Commissioner.6 Using his position as an RPR 
Deputy, Lafleur later expressed RPCR dissatisfaction with Pons' 4 November 1987 
Autonomy Statute in the French National Assembly. Lafleur claimed that the Autonomy 
Statute was biased in favour of the FLNKS in that Article 40 required a two-thirds 
majority for all decisions to be passed by the Territory's executive body. The Law 
Commission of the National Assembly supported Lafleur's claim that this would enable 
the FLNKS to block RPCR majority initiatives.? 
Despite RPCR confrontation over certain of Pons' proposals, the party's 
interests were more secure under him than with Lemoine or Pisani. When Pons 
presented his plan for the "sauvegarde de la democratie" in New Caledonia on 29 April 
1986, his project included the decision to reconcentrate Territorial funding controls with 
the Territorial Congress, which reduced the financial autonomy of FLNKS-
administered regions from the Noumean administration. 8 This move was consistent 
with Pons' past hostility to the prospect of the FLNKS gaining provisional autonomy 
1 Connell p.351; Herve Coutau-Begarie and Jean-Louis Seurin: Nouvelle-Caledonie: les antipodes de Ia 
democratie p.147. 
2 BIPA White File 25/4/85. 
3 Ibid. 12/12/84; 1-2/4/86. 
4 Le Monde 23/9/88 p.7. 
5 Ibid. 29/4/86 p.11. 
6 BIPA White File 29/4/86; Coutau-Begarie and Seurin p.166. 
7 Keesing's Contemporary Archives Vol. XXXIV March 1988 p.35778. 
8 BIPA White File 29/4/86. 
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within isolated regions of New Caledonia.! The result of this decision was that under 
the Chirac administration between 1986 and 1988, less than three million French francs 
were allocated to the three FLNKS-controlled regions, while over three and a half 
million francs were allocated to the RPCR-dominated Southern Region, already the 
most developed Region within New Caledonia.2 
RPCR pressure on the Chirac administration was maintained during the final 
months before its defeat in the May 1988 French Elections. In February 1988 Lafleur 
threatened Chirac with his resignation as an RPR Deputy unless the New Caledonian 
Regional Elections were moved forward to April to precede the French Presidential 
Elections) The RPCR did not desire the elections to be held later in the year after the 
possible election of a new PS administration. Bernard Pons later admitted in November 
1988 that in rescheduling the Regional Elections he had done so as a concession to the 
RPCR.4 But the most interesting aspect of the RPCR's "front de refus" was not its 
continued presence under Chirac. More important was its dismantlement after Chirac's 
defeat in May 1988. The result was to be an unprecedented level of successful RPCR 
dialogue with the FLNKS under the auspices of a PS administration. 
Majority conservatism 
The RPCR's status as the largest conservative party within New Caledonia has 
already been noted along with the various social and ethnic groups which lend the party 
differing levels of support. What remains to be investigated is the RPCR's claim to 
represent the electoral majority in New Caledonia. One of the cornerstones of the 
RPCR's political legitimacy has been its majority support: a majority which the FLNKS 
does not enjoy, as RPCR leaders have in the past shown no hesitation to indicate. 
Prior to the September 1985 Regional Elections when it gained control of three 
out of New Caledonia's four Regions, the FLNKS was regarded by RPCR leaders as 
an insubstantial group of extremists. Dick Ukeiwe declared in January 1985: "Le 
FLNKS n'a pas du tout de representativite politique. 11 ne represente qu'une infime 
minorite au sein meme du mouvement independantiste, tout comme il n'existe pas 
coutumierement. "5 
Similarly Jacques Lafleur, when asked in January 1985 to what extent he 
believed the FLNKS represented the New Caledonian population, he replied that the 
party was "une minorite qui ne represente que 10% a 15%". When asked if that 10-15% 
held physical control of the greater part of the Territory he gave a vigorous response: 
"C'est rigoureusement faux! 11 y a 250 types qui font regner la terreur, sur la cote est a 
Thio, a Nakety, en partie a Houai'lou, aussi a Ponerihouen, Hienghene, Bonde, sur une 
partie de l'ile de Lifou et, sur la cote ouest, un petit peu a Poya, Kone, Poum, Ouegoa, 
mais cela ne represente au plus un quart du territoire."6 
Lafleur's image of the FLNKS as a minority party with 10-15% support 
controlling at most one quarter of the Territory was tested in the September 1985 
Regional Elections, the first in which the FLNKS actively participated. In those 
elections the RPCR found that although it enjoyed majority support, that support was 
not distributed over the majority of the Territory. This is largely a consequence of New 
Caledonia's lopsided European and immigrant population distribution. The total RPCR 
vote of 37,146 (41.37% of the electorate) greatly exceeded the FLNKS's 20,544 votes 
(22.88% of the electorate) and formed an indisputable majority. But of that total RPCR 
vote, 71.6% (26,615 votes) was from the Southern Region. 72% of the Southern votes 
1 With regard to Pons' hostility to the FLNKS provisional government in 1984, see BIPA White File 
12/12/84. 
2 Besset p.103. 
3 Le Monde 7-8/2/88 p.2. 
4 Ibid. 23/9/88 p. 7. 
5 Le Monde 26/1/85 p.10. 
6 Ibid. 6-7/l/85 p.l. 
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were from Noumea alone. Only 13.5% of the RPCR's support came from the Central 
Region (5,003 votes), 7.8% from the North (2,888 votes) and 7.1% from the Loyalty 
Islands (2,640 votes).l The RPCR only had majority support in the South. The RPCR 
gained 70.6% of the votes there by comparison with the FLNKS's mere 7.5%. 
Elsewhere, the Regional totals fell in the FLNKS's favour: 45.4% in the Central Region 
compared with the RPCR's 41.9% of the vote there; 59.6% for the FLNKS in the 
North compared with 23.3% for the RPCR; and 52.1% for the FLNKS in the Loyalty 
Islands compared with only 28% for the RPCR.2 The RPCR's majority control was 
only exercised over one of New Caledonia's Regions. Yet it should be noted that in this 
and in later elections, the RPCR's voting levels in regions where it held only minority 
support were markedly higher than the levels of support enjoyed by the FLNKS in the 
South. 
The 11 June 1989 Provincial Elections demonstrated a similar pattern. 
Following the Matignon Accords, New Caledonia's Regions had been redrawn into 
three Provinces. The border between the Northern and Southern Provinces was drawn 
across the width of the Grande Terre, while the third Province is the Loyalty Islands. 
Once again the RPCR, despite gaining a clear overall majority of 27,777 votes ( 44.46% 
of the electorate) compared with theFLNKS's 17,898 votes (28.65% of the electorate), 
only achieved a majority in the South.3 The RPCR received 75% of its support (20,844 
votes) from the Southern Province, 14.5% from the North (4,041 votes) and 10.4% 
(2,892 votes) from the Loyalty Islands. In the South the RPCR gained 53.2% of the 
Provincial vote compared with the FLNKS's 11.77%, 27.33% in the North alongside 
the FLNKS's 63.39% and 33.98% of the Loyalty Islands vote compared with the 
FLNKS's 45.97%.4 The redrawing of regional boundaries did little to alter the nature 
of the RPCR's lopsided voter distribution centred on Noumea, or the FLNKS's 
predominance in New Caledonia's regions outside the South of the Grande Terre. This 
situation whereby a majority party only controls a minority of the Territory is unlikely to 
change in the near future unless New Caledonia's demographic patterns shift 
remarkably. 
The RPCR - a Noumean "parti des copains"? 
The RPCR's large support base in Noumea, over 70% of its total support, is the 
basic cause of past broussard accusations that the party is disinterested in the fate of the 
Territory's rural European minority. From its inception Noumean interests have played 
an important part in the direction of the RPCR. A major constituent party of the RPCR 
upon its creation in 1978 was the EDS. Formed in 1972 by Senator Henri Lafleur, his 
son Jacques Lafleur and Roger Laroque, the EDS was a conservative party which 
enjoyed electoral support mainly from Noumea. The EDS has been described as an 
upholder of Noumean bourgeois conservatism,S and the RPCR has largely continued in 
this vein. 
Despite Dick Ukeiwe's 1983 statement that "Nous [le RPCR] voulons le 
maximum de decentralisation et de deconcentration ... "6, there was little evidence of 
initiatives by the RPCR to decentralise New Caledonia's Noumean-centred economy 
and administration prior to 1988. A decade after the RPCR's formation, Noumea 
remained in 1988 the focal point of a highly centralised economy: 
Hegemonique, Noumea etouffe et ecrase le monde rural...Pas de valorisation des 
productions locales, ni transformation, ni distribution; pas d'outillage, d'ateliers, 
d'artisanat; pas de travaux, d'equipement, pas meme une vraie route transversale pour 
relier les differentes regions; pas de credit rural, pas de formation. Mais un 
1 Op. cit. Connell pp.362-363. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Le Monde 13/6/89 p.9. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Clark: Autonomy. Integration. Development: Elections in New Caledonia 1979-1982 p.22. 
6 Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes 5/10/83 op. cit. AFC p.54. 
decouragement systematique des productions locales par des importations 
concurentielles.1 
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Alain Christnacht notes that the import monopoly held by a handful of 
companies like Ballande,2 the Societe Barreau and the SCIE-Prisunic, has discouraged 
the development of local production.3 This Noumean economic predominance is not of 
the RPCR's creation, but the party has done little to lessen it. Certain important 
members of the RPCR who were not originally from the EDS have accepted its 
Noumean concerns. Jean Leques, who as leader of the MLC joined the RPCR in 1978 
with a record of advocacy of economic and administrative decentralisation, has not 
actively pursued those goals in the 1980s. His position as the former RPCR President 
of the South, and as Mayor of Noumea since 1985 partly explains his change in 
priorities.4 A concern primarily for Noumea has been the predominant one within the 
RPCR, not unreasonably considering that within Noumea lies over 70% of the RPCR's 
support. 
Of the former EDS leaders, it was Jacques Lafleur who played the dominent role 
in the RPCR, with Laroque as the party's elder statesman until his death in 1985. 
Jacques Lafleur was an important force within the RPCR and he channelled substantial 
amounts of capital from his business interests into the party. Four fifths of his SMSP, 
and two properties in Sologne were sold to furnish the RPCR with funds. 5 In 1984, 
Lafleur spent on average 30,000 French francs every day hiring helicopters to service 
broussard farms and villages isolated by the FLNKS. 6 
Lafleur's financial "empire" as it has been termed7 plays an significant part in 
New Caledonia's economy. In 1988 Lafleur held investments in 21 different 
companies. His most prominent business ventures include the establishment of the 
Novotel Surf Hotel and the Casino Royal in Anse Vata, and the Corail supermarket 
chain. Lafleur until1989 also had a controlling interest in the Territory's only daily 
newspaper, Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes, run by his nephew Frederic.s Lafleur's 
substantial business interests have drawn considerable adverse comment from both left 
and right. A common assumption is that Lafleur's political conservatism is motivated 
more by consideration for the protection of his personal financial "empire" rather than 
for the wider loyalist interests of the Caldoches. There is no evidence to confirm this 
assumption. 
Such cynicism over Lafleur's priorities also exists within the RPCR. Henri 
Leleu, the RPCR's Secretary-General, was expelled from the party in September 1985 
for his personal animosity over Lafleur's motives. Until he was accepted back into the 
RPCR in April 1988, Leleu conducted "une guerille personnelle sans concessions, 
contre M. Lafleur. "9 In 1987 Leleu, as leader of the centrist party RC, comprised of 
disaffected RPCR supporters, said of Lafleur: "Jacques Lafleur est un homme 
intelligent, mais il a trouve dans son berceau, ala fois !'argent et le pouvoir. C'est un 
enfant gate, volontiers despotique. "10 Leleu's personal attack was based on the 
assumption that Lafleur's success resulted from his inheritance of all his father's wealth 
and power. This assumption is not totally correct. Only 5% of Lafleur's investments in 
1988 were inherited from his father: his house in Noumea, and the Foch building where 
1 Bessetp.97; cf. p.11. 
2 In which Roger Laroque was the director and a major shareholder. See Connell p.150. 
3 Christnacht p.102. 
4 BIPA White File 18/11/84; 4/10/85; Le Monde 17-18/4/88 p.8. 
5 Le Point 19/12/88 p.84. 
6 Ibid. p.83. 
7 See ibid. 
8 Ibid. p.81. 
9 Le Monde 5/4/88 p.18. 
10 L'Evenement du jeudi 10-16/9/87 p.14. 
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the RPCR has its Noumean offices.! Most of Lafleur's financial "empire" and certainly 
his political status within the RPCR were established as a result of his own efforts. 
Lafleur's despotic image is one that he (has never entirely been able to dispel. 
This is despite active measures taken like his November 1988 defamation suit against 
the FN Secretary-General Jean-Pierre Stirbois for his remark that Lafleur was the 
"parrain d'une mafia d'affairistes" .2 For his opponents, Lafleur is a despotic godfather 
figure whose direction of the RPCR is conducted for the benefit of his own financial 
interests. This attitude even has some currency amongst RPCR members. As an 
anonymous RPCR supporter from Kone commented in 1988: "lei, pour certains au 
RPCR, c'est le fric d'abord, la France apres. "3 Lafleur has been accused of stacking the 
party's hierarchy with his personal friends, business associates and relatives, for 
example his nephew Philippe, head of the RPCR's personnel section.4 He has also 
been accused of extending the RPCR's interests beyond politics, using its influence on 
the Territorial administration to legislate to its own ends and to appoint RPCR members 
or associates into administrative positions. Besset writes of the RPCR: "Son influence 
s'etend a I' ensemble de la societe, a tel point qu'il est identifie a l'Etat. "5 
Conclusive proof of these practices is not abundant yet there does exist at least 
one well-documented case which confirms the accusations of Justin Guillemard and 
other RPCR opponents concerning RPCR corruption and cronyism. This is the 
administration of ADRAF by RPCR officials between 1986 and 1988 concerning which 
Fran~ois Asselineau, the French Inspector-General of Finances, released a report in 
September 1989. 
At the centre of what Guy Georges, the FN(NC) Secretary-General in 1987, 
described as "un scandale permanent"6 was Denis Milliard. Milliard, formerly an RPCR 
representative in the Territorial Assembly, was noted for his drafting of the 1985 
Milliard Plan, a bill designed to combat youth unemployment. The RPCR was accused 
of using this Plan to employ young Wallisians for its security branch.? In 1986, after 
the Chirac administration's disbanding of the Office foncier or Lands Office, and their 
creation of ADRAF, Milliard was appointed as ADRAF's Director-General. Until1988, 
when the second Mitterrand administration replaced Milliard, ADRAF was a major 
cause of political dissatisfaction for the FLNKS. Of 717 Melanesian land claims lodged 
with ADRAF between 1986 and 1988 only 36 were approved.s Caring little for the 
political sensitivity of his office, Milliard favoured only private Melanesian land 
ownership and he totally dismissed tribal land claims: "La revendication clanique, c'est 
de la poudre a perlimpinpin juridique." Amongst those Melanesians to whom he granted 
private land ownership were loyalist RPCR supporters at Voh and Thio.9 
More typically, Caldoche RPCR supporters benefited from ADRAF decisions. 
In 1987 Guillemard described ADRAF as "un carrefour qui se developpe seulement au 
profit des copains."lO Asselineau claimed nearly one third of the properties ADRAF 
purchased from Caldoches were overvalued.11 Jacques Lafleur himself was implicated 
in these land purchases and their resale at undervalued prices. In March 1987 ADRAF 
purchased a 5,900ha block of land from Lafleur's domain at Ouaco at a price equivalent 
1 Le Point 19/12/88 p.83. 
2 Le Monde 1/11/88 p.8. 
3 Ibid. 4/5/88 p.44. 
4 Besset p.44. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Le Monde 12/9/87 p.8. 
7 Connell p.353. 
8 Le Monde 22/9/89 p.10. 
9 Ibid. 12/9/87 p.8. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Le Monde 22/9/89 p.10. 
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to 40% of the Agency's budget. I Another ADRAF purchase of a 159ha block of land 
from Lafleur at Kaala-Gomen on 2 February 1988 was fast-tracked, undervalued by 
50% for resale, and then purchased again on the same day by Rene Marlier, a local 
landowner.2 
Other recipients of ADRAF land were Maurice Mitride, one of the Hienghene 
ambushers,* and Serge Vanhalle, a member of the RPCR's security section.t Mitride 
sold his Hienghene property to ADRAF for 42% above its market value, then purchased 
a 2ha block of land, undervalued 50% by ADRAF, in the safer surroundings of Mont 
Dore. Serge V anhalle also purchased a property undervalued 50% by ADRAF at La Foa 
in 1987.3 Auguste Parawi-Reybas, an RPCR Territorial Councillor, purchased an 8ha 
property at Houai1ou for 252,000 F CFP. The same block of land had'originally been 
purchased by the Office fonder in 1985 for 400,000F CFP. 37% of ADRAF's land 
sales betwen 1986 and 1988 were in the communes of Bourail and La Foa. Not a 
remarkable fact in itself, an added dimension arises when Milliard's participation in 
local body politics at Bourail is taken into account, along with the presence of his 
Assistant Director Philippe Gomes at La Foa. In the same 1986-1988 period, four 
blocks of land were sold to ADRAF employees and twelve blocks of land to relatives of 
ADRAF employees.4 
Following the takeover of the Agency by metropolitan administrators on 13 June 
1988, the new High Commissioner Bernard Grasset annulled 60 land deeds distributed 
by ADRAF since 1986, several of which were distributed just one day before the 
administrative changeover.s Lafleur's protestations over this decison did not diminish 
the damage done to the RPCR's reputation by its involvement in ADRAF. The 
corruption revealed, involving high-level members of the RPCR from Lafleur down to 
prominent but less significant party associates like Mitride and V anhalle, tarnished the 
RPCR's name. It also served to confirm Guillemard's accusations concerning the 
RPCR as a party of "copains". 
The Matignon Accords 
With the RPCR's cosignature of the Matignon Accords with the FLNKS on 26 
June 1988, metropolitan French perceptions of the RPCR were considerably modified. 
In the atmosphere of reconciliation involved the belief arose that the RPCR was not as 
intransigeant as it had been in the past. Praise was given to Jacques Lafleur from the 
most unlikely quarters. The French Socialist Prime Minister Michel Rocard said of him: 
"M. Lafleur est un homme honnete et droit. Et en plus il est protestant! "6 Leaving 
religion aside, the conclusions of Fran9ois Asselineau's investigations concerning 
ADRAF in September 1989 later cast doubts on the depth of Lafleur's integrity. Such 
doubts were also expressed in 1988 by the extreme right in New Caledonia, who 
accused Lafleur of capitulating to the FLNKS and to Mitterrand in signing the Accords. 
Just what motives were involved, and the implications of the Matignon Accords for the 
RPCR, will be discussed below. 
In explaining why Lafleur signed the Matignon Accords against some 
opposition from extremist members within the RPCR, it should be pointed out that his 
emphasis on the RPCR's goals differs somewhat from that of outsiders like Besset and 
Coulon.* For Lafleur, unlike Besset, opposition to Kanak independence is not the 
1 Ibid. 12/9/87 p.8. 
2 Ibid. 22/9/89 p.lO. 
* Cf. above p.14. 
t Cf. below p.49. Vanhalle is the husband of Marie-Jose Vanhalle. 
3 Le Monde 22/9/89 p.lO. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 27/8/88 p.22. 
* See above p.28. 
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fundamental aim of the RPCR. At the time of the FLNKS's Territorial Elections boycott 
in November 1984, Lafleur spoke in broader terms concerning the objectives of the 
RPCR: "La premier, ramener la paix dans ce pays ... ; et deuxiemement recreer la 
prosperite economique. "t 1 
For Lafleur opposition to Kanak independence, whilst being undoubtedly 
important to the RPCR, was a subsidiary component of these two broader goals. The 
RPCR's refusal of Kanak independence was due to its recognition of association with 
France as a necessary precondition to continued peace and prosperity in New 
Caledonia. The RPCR's manifesto for the November 1984 Territorial Elections stressed 
that economic prosperity would be encouraged by free enterprise, the support of private 
property,§ agricultural development and Territorial self-sufficiency in food. Peace was 
to be encouraged by the integration of Melanesians into Caldoche society. Specifically 
this was to be achieved through improved educational opportunities and generally 
through the encouragement of individual freedom.2 
For the RPCR in 1984, the FLNKS's independence aims were synonymous 
with neither peace nor economic prosperity. The FLNKS was regarded as being anti-
democratic in its boycott of the November 1984 Territorial Elections. It was thought that 
Kanak independence would lead New Caledonia into political anarchy and economic 
collapse.¥ Jeannine Bouteille, in an AFC propaganda leaflet air-dropped into 
Melanesian rural areas, compared New Caledonia's supposed fate under independence 
with that of Africa's less fortunate independent nations. Included was a picture of a 
healthy black baby described as the inhabitant of "la colonie fran9aise", alongside a 
malnourished infant portrayed as the product of "l'independance raciste".3 In 1985 
Paitel portrayed Kanak independence as an action courting social and economic disaster 
and a reversion to tribal primitivism.4 In 1985, Lafleur too promoted the proposition 
that members of the FLNKS had no interest in peace, but were only capable of violent 
dismption and destruction: 
Quand on voit a Thio M. Machoro mettre le canon d'un fusil contre la tete d'une 
femme enceinte de huit mois et obliger le mari a manger des aliments sur lesquels il 
pisse, en menartant Ia femme, vous appelez rta comment? La democratie? La Libert6? 5 
Regardless of the level of reliability of such details, for Lafleur they did not 
bode well for New Caledonia's future independence. 
By 1988, circumstances had changed. In additon to Tjibaou's more moderate 
stance and his expressed willingness to search for a peaceful resolution to Melanesian 
claims, Lafleur accepted that Tjibaou was genuine in this resolve. Lafleur commented 
of Tjibaou in July 1988: "C'est un autre homme dont le langage raisonnable a ete 
apprecie. II a la responsabilite de Ia paix et celle de retablir la democratie au sein du 
FLNKS."6 
For Lafleur, who in 1985 saw Tjibaou as the leader of a marginal, anti-
democratic group,* Tjibaou was by 1988 the leader of a legitimate political party. 
Lafleur's recognition of Tjibaou partly led to an opening of dialogue with the FLNKS. 
Lafleur claimed on 25 June 1988 that this was not merely his desire but also that of the 
RPCR in general: "Le RPCR a ete d'accord pour dialoguer ... chacun est d'accord pour 
tOr "Ia defense du capitalisme" as Coulon describes it: Coulon p.148. 
1 Le Monde 18/11/84 p.IO. 
§ Cf. Bouteille and Ukeiwe above on p.21. 
2 Connell p.324. 
¥ See Ukeiwe above on p.30. 
3 AFC p.147. 
4 Paitel pp.207, 208. 
5 Le Monde 6-7/1/85 p.l. 
6 Ibid. 29n/88 p.6. 
*See above p.29. 
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dialoguer, mais chacun n'acceptera n'importe quoi. "1 This statement was made only a 
month after RPCR militants demanded that Pons order the arrest of Tjibaou, Leopold 
Joredie and Yeiwene Yeiwene and outlaw the FLNKS during the Ouvea hostage 
incident.2 
Such militancy does not dissolve in a matter of weeks. It is questionable 
whether Lafleur did have the total support of the RPCR at that stage. Rather, Lafleur's 
personal motives were of greater importance. He claimed during the negotiation of the 
Matignon Accords in Paris that his ill-health had prompted his decision to negotiate with 
the FLNKS. Suffering from a heart condition, Lafleur realised he was nearing the end 
of his career: "M. Rocard, lorsque je me couche le soir, je me demande si je vais me 
reveiller le lendemain. "3 Lafleur wished that as his political legacy some lasting 
consensus might be achieved between the FLNKS and the RPCR. He was also fearful 
that the next political generation might cause the New Caledonian political situation to 
deteriorate further: "Il faut faire vite. Ceux qui prendront notre place ne se connaissent 
pas."4 
Alongside this concern for posterity, Lafleur realised that with the re-election of 
President Mitterrand in May 1988 and his presence in government alongside a PS 
administration until at least 1993, the French political climate had changed. The RPCR 
was no longer in the privileged position it enjoyed under the Chirac government and 
would have to present a more conciliatory image to the Rocard government. 
After Mitterrand' s re-election, Lafleur reiterated his dissatisfaction with the Pons 
Statute. He stated on 1 June 1988 that the Pons Statute needed a replacement. At the 
same time he admitted the extent of New Caledonia's ethnic divisions and the necessity 
to bridge them through a greater sharing of political power. This was a marked change 
from his previous position that the RPCR alone, as the voice of the majority, was in the 
best position to decide New Caledonia's interests: 
11 faut que les responsabilires soient partagees, il faut que chacun des opposants trouve 
son equilibre dans son aire de responsabilites, il faut que ces responsabilites soient 
larges, il faut que l'Etat donne toutes leurs chances a ces zones et a ces hommes de 
reussir.s 
No longer did Lafleur believe that the FLNKS could be disregarded politically 
due to its minority support and its peripheral control of the Territory.* By 1988 he 
regarded the mutual recognition of the FLNKS and the RPCR as essential if future 
peace was to be maintained in New Caledonia. If not, incidents like those on Ouvea in 
1988 would continue and perhaps even spread to the point of civil war: 
Nous avons le choix entre le bain de sang et Ia recherche d'une solution. Je ne suis pas 
pour le bain de sang. Ensuite, si la discussion commence, il faut que nous admettions 
les uns et les autres deux realites incontournables: il faut qu'ils [les independantistes] 
reconnaissent que nous [les loyalistes] existons, que nous ne nous en irons jamais, et 
que nous sommes largement majoritaires; et nous, nous reconnaissons qu'il y a dans Ia 
communaute melanesienne, des independantistes, et qu'ils sont incontournables ... un 
mauvais accord vaut mieux qu'une bonne guerre civile parce qu'il n'y a jamais de 
bonne guerre civile ... 6 
Whilst exhibiting a changed attitude to the FLNKS, it should be noted that 
Lafleur's signature of the 1988 Matignon Accords was consistent with his 1984 
statement concerning peace and prosperity as the RPCR's primary goals. It was 
1 Le Monde 25/5/88 p.ll. 
2 Ibid. 28/4/88 p.40. 
3 Le Nouvel Observateur 24-30/6/88 p.41. 
4 Ibid. 1-7/6/88 p.28. 
5 Le Monde 2/6/88 p.15. 
* See above p.32. 
6 Le Figaro 3/6/88 op. cit. Le Monde 4/6/88 p.7. 
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Lafleur's hope that the Accords' ten year development period between 1988 and 1998 
prior to a Territorial self-determination referendum would permit the economic 
transformation of the RPCR-controlled Southern Province: 
Nous [le RPCR], nous allons, je l'espere, transformer notre region en une sorte de 
paradis economique et social, culture! et humain. Nous avons d'immenses projets pour 
faire en dix ans de notre region la vraie vitrine de la France dans le Pacifique dans I' an 
2000.1 
Besset pointed out that in conceding recognition to the FLNKS and its "aire de 
responsabilites" under the Matignon Accords, Lafleur ceded it "une partie du pays sans 
interet economique. "2 Although the North and Loyalty Island Provinces will receive 
regional development funds they are unlikely to equal the modernity of the RPCR-
controlled South. Lafleur dismissed these considerations in November 1988: 
La crainte de Tjibaou reside dans cette constation que le Sud a de l'avance par rapport 
au Nord. C'est vrai. Mais dans les faits, cela devrait aller plus vite la ou il y a du retard 
que la ou l'on doit construire sur ce qui existe deja. Si on fait un plan de 
developpement intelligent, les potentialites du Nord soot plus importants.3 
Concerning development, existing capacities are more important than future 
potentialities. Even with preferential levels of funding it is unlikely that in 1998 the 
North and the Loyalty Islands will have achieved the South's level of development in 
1989, still less that of Lafleur's projected "paradis economique". The South has within 
its confines Tontouta International Airport, the Yate hydroelectric dam, the mining 
centres of Thio and Kouaoua, and the rural centre of Bourail, in addition to Noumea 
with its port, commerce, administration, and large workforce. 
The South is likely to remain the most economically prosperous and advanced 
region of New Caledonia by 1998. As Pierre Maresca, the RPCR's Secretary-General, 
noted of the Matignon Accords: "Il assure le contrOle du province demographiquement 
et economiquement la plus important au RPCR, de meme que la majorite absolue au 
congres du territoire. "4 
Maresca's comments on the Matignon Accords, made in a letter to Fran~ois 
Leotard in October 1988 merit further attention. Maresca argued that the Accords were a 
substantial victory for the RPCR: 
A !'evidence, Tjibaou et le FLNKS cherchaient une sortie politique honorable, et ils 
l'ont trouvee. Mais ils n'ont rien obtenu de plus, globalement, que ce que leur 
concooait le statut Pons, qui leur aurait permis de controler deux regions sur quatre et 
de disposer au sein du conseil executif d'une minorite de blocage.* Sur taus les points 
d'ordre specifiquement politique- corps electoral, decoupage des provinces, nombre de 
representants pour chacune d'elles au congres, repartition des credits de fonctionnement 
- qui ont ete les pierres d'achoppement des discussions, ils ont finalement accepte nos 
points de vue ... Enfin, la question du corps electoral revele implicitement la plus 
importante concession politique du FLNKS, qui, en acceptant pour la premiere fois 
que les Caloooniens de toutes ethnies votent en 1998, abandonne sa revendication 
d'independance canaque qui etait basee sur la composition d'un corps electoral 
uniquement canaque.5 
The FLNKS's abandonment of its "victims of history" criteria for the 1998 self-
determination referendum was a marked change from its earlier position. The FLNKS's 
boycott of the September 1987 self-determination referendum was partly due to the 
RPCR's refusal to recognise this issue. Having conceded this point, the FLNKS is less 
likely to gain a majority vote in favour of independence in the 1998 referendum. 
1 Le Monde 29/6/88 p.9. 
2 Besset p.127. 
3 Le Monde 29/11/88 p.11. 
4 Ibid. 18/10/88 p.8. 
* Cf. above p.31. 
5 Le Monde 18/10/88 p.8. 
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Assuming population trends of the 1980s continue, it has been estimated that only 
44.5% of the New Caledonian electorate will be Melanesian in 1998.1 As was 
demonstrated in Chapter One, by no means are all Melanesian voters to be considered in 
favour of independence. It is the RPCR's hope that given a ten year development period 
prior to the plebiscite, more Melanesians will be convinced of the material advantages of 
continued association with France. Overall, the RPCR is confident that the 1998 
referendum will fall in favour of continued links with France. Maresca wrote that 
"toutes les projections effectuees sur dix ans revelent que nous [le RPCR] serons 
largement majoritaires en 1998 et que le destin de la Nouvelle-Caledonie sera celui que 
voudra la majorite actuelle [le RPCR] et non le FLNKS."2 
Not all New Caledonian loyalists were as confident as the RPCR's leadership 
regarding the Matignon Accords. Despite Lafleur's June 1988 assertion that he had 
RPCR party support,* Lafleur later mentioned in Paris on 6 July 1988 that like Tjibaou 
he too would have problems convincing extremists of the worth of the Accords: "Je 
rencontrerai egalement des difficultes. n faudra convaincre la population, les electeurs 
RPCR."3 
Lafleur totally failed to convince the extreme right. In July 1988 the RPCR-
dominated Territorial Congress voted 35 to 11 in favour of the Matignon Accords. 
Those who voted against supporting the Accords included all the FC and FN(NC) 
Councillors present.4 In May 1988 both parties had refused to open any dialogue with 
Christian Blanc's mission to New Caledonia on behalf of the Rocard government. For 
Guy Georges, the head of the FN(NC) in 1988, dealing with PS representatives was 
out of the question. The mere prospect of having Mitterrand as the President of France 
for a second term was outrageous: "la Nouvelle-Caledonie a plonge dans l'horreur." 
Attempting to negotiate with his representatives was untenable due to past PS efforts to 
lead New Caledonia into independence through the Lemoine and Pisani Statutes: "Non 
seulement il [Mitterrand] nous meprise, mais i1 nous prend pour des cons. "5 
Justin Guillemard also bitterly opposed the RPCR's "honteuse capitulation" and 
"pseudo-dialogue" as he described it before the Territorial Congress on 20 September 
1988. Haranguing the RPCR Councillors present, Guillemard claimed the Matignon 
Accords had "partage le pouvoir politique et economique entre les politico-affairistes [le 
RPCR], d'une part, et les assasins terroristes [le FLNKS] d'autre part, pour 
supposement dix ans, laps de temp qui vous permettra encore de realiser quelques 
bonnes et jute uses affaires!" 
It became clear in the aftermath of the Matignon Accords that RPCR loyalist 
voters too were not yet convinced of the need for dialogue with the FLNKS. Despite 
the RPCR's public support of the Matignon Accords, in the 6 November 1988 French 
referendum on the Accords five Southern communes voted overwhelmingly against 
them. Not only did these five communes include Dumbea and Bourail, centres of RPCR 
dissent where Bernard Marantt and Justin Guillemard respectively are prominent, but 
also Noumea, the centre of the RPCR's support. In Noumea 63.7% of the voters said 
"no" to the Matignon Accords. 56.37% did so at Mont Dore, 53.02% at La Foa, 
79.33% at Farino, 65.87% at Dumbea and 56.31% at Bourai1.6 Alain Rollat 
commented of these figures: "M. Lafleur, eminent signataire des accords de Matignon, 
n'appara!t plus representatif dans son propre domaine electoral."? 
1 See Le Point 14/11/88 p.27. 
2 Le Monde 18/10/88 p.8. 
* See above p.38. 
3 Le Monde 6/7/88 p.8. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Le Monde 28/5/88 p.13. 
t Marant is the mayor of Dumbea; a former RPCR councillor who left the party in 1987. 
6 Le Monde 8/11/88 p.8. 
7 Ibid. 
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Lafleur steadfastly denied that he had lost the support of his electorate over the 
Matignon Accords in November 1988: "Des milliers de lettres et des centaines de coups 
de telephone m'ont convaincu que le vote n'etait pas dirige contre moi, je suis serein. "1 
Lafleur drew a fine distinction in claiming that the loyalists who voted "no" were not 
rejecting the Matignon Accords but rather the need to hold a referendum on the Accords. 
At the same time he blamed the FN(NC) for leading RPCR supporters astray: "ils [le 
FN] ont profite de la naivete des gens pour les affoler pour que des conflits eclatent. "2 
Following the 6 November 1988 referendum, it appeared that the RPCR might 
be losing its loyalist majority support to parties of the extreme right over its signature of 
the Matignon Accords. 
The FN(NC) and its extremist challenge to the RPCR 
Of New Caledonia's loyalist parties, the FN(NC) in 1988 stood second in 
popularity to the RPCR. The party was formed in May 1984 with the support of Jean-
Marie Le Pen's metropolitan French FN. Initially led by Pierre Guillemard, the party 
began with only a few dozen members but rapidly gained wider support. In the June 
1984 Elections for French representatives to the European Parliament, the FN obtained 
16% of the New Caledonian vote, exceeding the 11% support it gained in metropolitan 
France.3 
The FN(NC)'s voter support has, like the RPCR's, consistently centered on 
Noumea. In the November 1984 Territorial Assembly Elections the FN(NC), under the 
name PFL, obtained 1,369 votes in Noumea. These votes formed 57% of its total vote 
of 2,379, spread over all three Regions of the Grande Terre. The FN(NC) obtained 
77% of its total support in the South. Support outside the South was negligible, a mere 
376 votes in the West and 165 votes in the East. No FN(NC) electoral list was 
presented in the Loyalty Islands probably due to a combination of the party's racist 
image and the Islands' Melanesian population. Overall the FN(NC) obtained 6.1% of 
the Territorial vote, a figure disproportionately large due to the FLNKS's election 
boycott. Roger Galliot, the FN(NC) Mayor of Thio, was elected into the Territorial 
Assembly. Despite his participation in the party, only 65 votes were cast for the 
FN(NC) in Thio, compared with 353 for the RPCR.4 
If only by association with its parent party, the FN(NC) stood to the right of the 
RPCR's more mainstream conservatism. The FN(NC)'s formation in 1984 was a 
consequence of New Caledonia's increasing political polarisation over the issue of 
independence. Unlike the RPCR's largely autonomous relationship with the RPR, the 
FN(NC)'s status is one of subordinacy to the FN. Le Pen's decisions are an important 
influence on the FN(NC). A good example concerns Neoere's resignation as the 
FN(NC)'s Secretary-General in January 1986, after the circulation of a letter by Le Pen 
questioning the presence of a Melanesian in such a prominent position. The FN(NC) 
appointed Neoere in 1984 partly in an attempt to dispel the FN's racist reputation. 
Connell suggests Le Pen's desire to expel Neoere was not due to his inability as a 
Secretary-General, but was rather a result of'Le Pen's own racism.s The RPR does not 
exercise such a degree of control over the RPCR. Chirac would be unlikely to urge the 
dismissal of a member of the RPCR's hierarchy, still less have such wishes fulfilled. At 
times, Lafleur has distanced the RPCR from the RPR. A recent example was his 
disassociation from the RPR's 1988 internal split over support of the Matignon 
1 Le Monde 9/ll/88 p.8. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Connell p.314. 
4 Ibid. pp.323, p.327. 
5 Connell p.370. 
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Accords.1 The FN (NC) does not enjoy such a degree of autonomy from the FN and has 
followed the political line of its parent party in opposing the Matignon Accords. 
From its inception, the FN(NC) has vigorously opposed the FLNKS and has 
criticised the RPCR for its allegedly weak opposition to Kanak independantistes. In 
January 1985, Roger Galliot accused the FLNKS of being in league with the Eastern 
bloc: "Nos adversaires [le FLNKS] ne veulent pas une decolonisation mais un transfert 
de colonisation vers les pays de l'Est."2 Even more remarkable was Neoere's assertion 
concerning Jacques Lafleur: "Lafleur, sans le dire, est pour l'independance canaque 
socialiste."3 Like Gabriel and Kermel, Neoere believed Lafleur was willing to sacrifice 
New Caledonia's links with France in order to protect his business "empire".4 In 1985, 
nothing could be further from the truth considering Lafleur's public dismissals of the 
FLNKS.* But in making this claim, Neoere sought to establish the FN(NC) as a party 
with an identity distinct from the RPCR's mainstream conservatism and render that 
conservatism discreditable. 
In the September 1985 Regional Elections, the FN(NC) offered only one 
electoral list in the South. The party's limited support obtained outside the South in the 
November 1984 Territorial Elections was probably the reason for this decision. 
Overall the FN(NC) gained 6.1% of the Territorial vote. In the South once again the 
overwhelming majority of the FN(NC)'s electoral support came from Noumea, notably 
from the suburbs of Anse Vata and Faubourg Blanchot.5 75.4% (3,970 votes) of the 
party's total support of 5,263 votes were from Noumea. As a result of this increased 
support, the FN(NC) gained three seats in the South, a consolidation of its earlier 
Noumean support.6 The FN(NC)'s main competition in the South was not the FLNKS, 
which only obtained 7.5% of the votes there (2,820 votes), but the RPCR with its 
70.6% of the Southern vote (26,615 votes).? The FN(NC) aimed to attract European 
voters away from the RPCR, rather than Melanesians, for whom the party's image held 
very little appeal. 
In the Central Region the situation was different. The FN(NC) initially offered 
an electoral list there too, but this was withdrawn on Le Pen's orders following his 
arrival in the Territory days before the elections. Le Pen decided to subordinate the 
FN(NC)'s interests in the Central Region to the greater good of the wider loyalist 
cause. His fear was that the FN(NC)'s presence in this marginal Region would split the 
loyalist vote and allow the FLNKS to gain a majority. 8 Le Pen's decision did not lead to 
the RPCR gaining a decisive advantage as the FLNKS gained a Regional majority of 
5,434 votes against the RPCR's 5,003 votes.9 
Le Pen's decision concerning the Central Region marked the beginning of 
further co-operation with the RPCR during the March 1986 French Elections. The 
FN(NC) combined with the RPCR to contest the elections with a joint electoral list. It is 
uncertain whether this action was indicative more of increased RPCR conservatism or 
decreased FN(NC) extremism. Whichever, the elections displayed that the two parties 
did have a certain amount of common ground between them.10 
The FN(NC) continued to increase its electoral support in 1988, a year during 
which it became increasingly hostile to the RPCR over that party's signature of the 
Matignon Accords. The 24 April1988 Regional Elections, marred by an FLNKS active 
1 Le Monde 13/10/88 p.7. 
2 Ibid. 30/l/85 p.8. 
3 Ibid. 
4 See Gabriel and Kermel p.208. 
*See above pp.29,32. 
5 Connell p.359. 
6 Op. cit. ibid. p.362. 
7 Connell p.362. 
8 Ibid. p.359. 
9 Op. cit. ibid. p.362. 
10 Connell p.370. 
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boycott which forced the closure of 38 polling offices,! were the FN(NC)'s most 
successful elections. For the first time the party ran lists in all four of New Caledonia's 
Regions. In the South the FN(NC) gained 23.63% of the vote (7 ,329 votes), sufficient 
to give it a total of five seats. 2 The party also polled well in the Western Region, gaining 
28.59% of the Regional vote there (3,275 votes). Three seats were won as a result of 
this support.3 The FN(NC)'s Western success can partially be attributed to the presence 
of Justin Guillemard at the head of the party's list there. In Bourail he attracted 41.76% 
of the commune's votes, as opposed to the trifling 1.8% (or 35 votes) obtained there by 
the FN(NC) in November 1984, before Guillemard's involvement with the party.4 The 
absence of the FLNKS from the elections was also an important contribution in 
permitting broussards to vote for the FN(NC) without concern for splitting the loyalist 
vote. Rollat wrote of the FN(NC)'s overall electoral success that "le centre de gravite du 
courant conservateur territorial se deplace vers !'extreme droite sous !'influence du 
Front national, en progres spectaculaire. "5 
Jacques Lafleur's September 1987 statement that "nous [le RPCR] allons ecarter 
les extremistes" was made to sound decidedly hollow in 1988.6 Following the RPCR's 
setback over the 6 November 1988 referendum* it was Guy Georges's belief that 
exactly the opposite would take place: "Nous [le FN] demandons que le gouvernement 
remette en cause les accords de Matignon, ramene tout le monde autour de la table avec 
la presence des forces loyalistes non-RPCR pour engager une renegociation."7 Instead 
of the RPCR sweeping away the FN(NC), it was the latter's contention that their 
minority support had expanded to the extent that the RPCR would be forced to make 
room. After the 6 November referendum it appeared that the FN(NC) Councillor 
Bernard Herpin's insistence that the Accords had surrendered New Caledonia to the 
"folie meurtriere du FLNKS" was widely agreed with by the loyalist electorate.s 
For all the confidence expressed by Georges regarding the FN(NC)'s electoral 
successes of 1988, and the uncomfortable position those gains placed the RPCR in, 
they were not to continue. Factional disputes overtook the FN(NC). Bernard Marant 
joined forces with the FN(NC) dissident Matelot Dubois to form CD. The cause of 
Dubois' departure was reputedly a brawl with Camille Fournier, an FN(NC) 
spokesman and local novelist.9 Marant led the CD's Southern list in the 11 June 1989 
Provincial Elections, while Dubois led the party's list in the North. CD polled 5.15% 
of the Territorial electorate, with 7.02% of the Southern vote (2,751 votes), 2.44% in 
the North (361 votes) and 1.25% in the Loyalty Islands (107 votes). CD gained two 
seats in the South.1o 
While CD gained two Southern seats, the FN(NC) lost two seats there, leaving 
it a total of three in that Province. The FN(NC) gained 9.85% of the Southern vote 
(3,860 votes). In the North it obtained only 2.32% of the vote (344 votes). The party's 
total level of support was 6.72% of the Territorial vote (4,204 votes),l1 This marked a 
return to pre-1988 support levels and the FN(NC) reverted to being an electorally 
marginal party with support confined largely to Noumea. The FN(NC)'s inability to 
1 Le Monde 26/4/88 p.36. 
2 Ibid. 27/4/88 p.13; 26/4/88 p.36. 
3 Ibid. 26/4/88 p.36. 
4 Ibid.; op. cit. Connell p.326. 
5 Le Monde 26/4/88 p.36. 
6 Ibid. 16/9/87 p.9. 
* See above pp.40-41. 
7 Le Monde 8/11/88 p.8. 
8 Ibid. 22/9/88 p.lO. 
9 Ibid. 10/6/89 p.14. 
10 Ibid. 13/6/89 p.9. 
11 Le Monde 13/6/89 p.9. 
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hold its ranks together, and its failure to expand its support by forming a coalition with 
the FC led to this setback.1 
The RPCR's mobilisation for the 11 June 1989 Provincial Elections was another 
reason for the FN(NC)'s diminished support. The RPCR made a concerted effort to 
canvas support during the elections, unlike the 6 November 1988 referendum preceding 
which the party kept a low profile in order not to embarrass the RPR.2 Jacques Lafleur 
devoted his attention to recapturing support in Southern communes like Farino where 
opposition to the Matignon Accords expressed in the November referendum was high.3 
The FN(NC)'s doubts over the strength of the RPCR's support were dispelled when 
the RPCR gained 44.46% of the Territorial vote (27,777 votes) in the June Elections.4 
The loyalist electorate had closed ranks behind the RPCR. 
The FC - marginal extremism 
The FC has obtained poor electoral results compared with the FN. As a minority 
party of the extreme right the FC is however worth examining due to its independent 
status. It is in this respect that the FC differs from the FN(NC). As shall be shown, 
whilst this independence has allowed the FC to follow its own path, that path has 
involved many difficulties. 
The FC was formed in 1982 by Justin Guillemard who was at that time an 
RPCR representative in the Territorial Assembly. Guiart has sought to use Guillemard's 
link with the RPCR to imply that the FC was founded as an extremist front for the 
RPCR, but this is doubtful considering Guillemard's later outspoken criticisms of the 
RPCR.5 Guillemard's allegiance to the RPCR has been far from unswerving and he 
has shown little hesitation to oppose the party on certain issues from both within and 
outside its ranks. 
Guillemard founded the FC as a breakaway party from the PNC. Established in 
January 1982 by Georges Chatenay, with the support of Guillemard, Roger Galliot and 
Henri Morini, the PNC was a forceful assertion of Caldoche nationalism.6 The party 
advocated a Rhodesian form of white minority rule for New Caledonia. By the end of 
1982 Guillemard had successfully won over the PNC's followers after founding the 
FC.7 
Unlike the FN(NC) with its predominantly Noumean support, under Guillemard 
the FC combined broussard interests with those of recent metro arrivals and pieds-
noirs. 8 Guillemard's personal concerns as a broussard and his following in Bourail 
assured that the FC would not be solely a Noumean party. His work with RURALE 
centered on opposition to sales of privately-owned broussard property as a result of 
Melanesian land claims.9 Similarly the FC strongly opposed land reforms, with threats 
of direct action against the FJ.10 The FC opposed independence, and proposed that 
New Caledonia should receive the less autonomous status of a French Overseas 
1 Le Monde 12-13/3/89 p.ll. 
2 Ibid. 16-17/10/88 p.6. 
3 Ibid. 12-13/3/89 p.ll. 
4 Ibid. 13/6/89 p.9. 
5 Guiart p.VIII; cf. above pp.13, 40. 
6 Chatenay is a lawyer who has been active in New Caledonian politics since the 1950s. He is notable 
for his 1957 founding of the RS and his later involvement in the UDNC, a coalition formed in 1968 
with Roger Laroque and Henri Lafleur: See Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff: The French Pacific 
Islands: French Polynesia and New Caledonia pp.305, 327. 
7 Connell p.305. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Wardp.55. 
10 Connell p.306. 
45 
Department.1 Another ideological strand was the FC's link with Roger Ludeau's 
Association des amis des Etats-Unis, a social group with a self-estimated 10,000 
members by 1985.2 
For uncertain reasons, Guillemard left the FC in 1984 and rejoined the RPCR, 
where he sat uncomfortably until his expulsion in 1987.3 Guillemard took his Bourail 
supporters with him. Claude Sarran assumed the leadership of the FC and led the party 
in the November 1984 Territorial Elections under the name Renouveau de !'Opposition 
en Caledonie (ROC).4 The name was a reaction to the formation of the FLNKS; a call 
for a rallying of loyalist opposition to Melanesian independence. Sarran held to party 
policy established under Guillemard's leadership. He stressed the importance of giving 
New Caledonia the same administrative status as Corsica, and advocated free market 
economic goals, namely "deserrer le carcan administratif, afin de favoriser !'initiative 
privee et d'alleger la fiscalite, en supprimant notamment l'impot sur le revenu."5 The 
FC gained substantially fewer votes in the elections than the newly established 
FN(NC). Sarran led an electoral list in the South alone and gained a mere 732 votes; 
1.9% of the Territorial vote, itself marred by Melanesian abstentions. 6 This was little to 
show for two year's presence on the New Caledonian political scene. By February 
1985, the FC only had 300 members.? 
In 1985 the FC raised its public profile and its credibility with loyalists as a 
result of the Thio "picnic". On 17 February 1985 the FC organised a motorcade to the 
FLNKS-occupied centre of Thio. Some 400 people, around 170 of whom claimed to be 
"refugees" from Thio, crossed the Humbolt Massif to the east coast in defiance of 
Edgard Pisani. In the confrontation which resulted between Melanesian FLNKS 
supporters from the Saint Philippo tribe and FC supporters, gendarmes dispersed the 
Melanesians with grenades and teargas. Several people were injured. 8 The occasion 
gave Sarran the opportunity to expound his views to the metropolitan French press. 
Two days after the "picnic", he expressed his opinion that under the Mitterrand 
government "la Nouvelle-Caledonie est devenue la Pologne."9 Just as Poland had 
proven a problem area for Moscow, so too was New Caledonia proving troublesome 
for the Paris administration. Sarran expressed his wish that "le drame caledonien doit 
etre le Watergate de Mitterrand", yet strenuously denied that the FC was acting outside 
the law: 
Nons [le FC] ne sommes pas des extremistes. Nons sommes, c'est vrai, a droite dn 
RPCR, mais nons representons la Caledonie profonde et nons sommes extremement 
Iegalistes: nons demandons simplement !'application dans le territoire des lois de la 
Repnbliqne fran~aise.lO 
Edgard Pisani did not share Sarran's view that the FC's members were 
"extremement legalistes" and ordered that Sarran and four other FC leaders be deported 
from the Territory.l1 The five went into hiding for several months and, after they 
refused an RPCR offer of safe passage to Tahiti, the RPCR publicly lent support to 
them. Connell suggests that the RPCR's subsequent organisation of a large Noumean 
1 Connell p.305. 
2 Le Monde 9/3/85 p.6; Connell p.306. 
3 Connell p.347; cf. above p.13. 
4 Connell p.323. 
5 Le Monde 19/2/85 p.8. 
6 Op. cit. Connell p.327. 
7 Le Monde 19/2/85 p.l. 
8 Connell pp.347-348. 
9 Le Monde 19/2/85 p.8. 
10 Ibid. p.l. 
11 Connell p.348. 
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public rally in support of the FC was an attempt to garner credibility through association 
with Sarran.l 
Ultimately the Thio "picnic" backfired on the FC. With Sarran keeping a low 
profile, the party did not succeed in mobilising for the September 1985 Regional 
Elections. By the time of the January 1986 Municipal By-elections, the FC did gain 
10% of the Noumean vote, but the party was still far from achieving a broad loyalist 
support base.2 This may have been the reason why Sarran later left the FC. Like 
Guillemard, by 1988 he was a representative for the FN(NC).3 The FN(NC)'s broader 
minority support permitted a better platform for the extremist views of both former FC 
leaders than their previous party. 
With such links between the FC and the FN(NC), it is surprising the two have 
not formed a coalition. Both stand on similar ideological ground and have reacted in 
unison against certain RPCR initiatives. Prior to the September 1987 self-determination 
referendum, both the FC and the FN(NC) rejected the RPCR's motion to restrict voting 
rights to those inhabitants of New Caledonia who had resided in the Territory for three 
years. Both saw the decision as a weak centrist concession to the FLNKS.4 With regard 
to the Matignon Accords the FC, like the FN(NC), expressed opposition: "[l'accord] ne 
contient pratiquement pas de garanties pour les loyalistes [et] hypotheque l'avenir du 
territoire."5 Without a coalition of the extreme right, the FC has found itself electorally 
stalemated as a poor second to the FN(NC) in terms of voter support. 
In the FLNKS-boycotted 24 April 1988 Regional Elections, the FC gained two 
seats in the South, the only Region where the party participated.6 The FC's total was 
9.16% of the voting electorate (2,916 votes), a gain in support in comparison with the 
November 1984 Territorial Elections, yet still substantially less than the FN(NC)'s 
support.* This achievement proved to be short-lived. In the 11 June 1989 Provincial 
Elections, the FC's losses were heavier than the FN(NC)'s. The FC lost both of its 
Southern seats and gained only 4.11% of the vote there (1,611 votes). This figure 
translates into only 2.57% of the Territorial vote.? Once again, the South was the only 
area where the FC offered an electoral list. 
At the end of the 1980s, the FC has still failed to capture a significant share of 
the loyalist vote, and unless another vigorous leader like Guillemard or Sarran emerges, 
the FC will remain a marginal electoral second to the FN(NC). Both the FN(NC) and 
the FC have found that, electorally, loyalists in New Caledonia prefer to support the 
RPCR. As a result, these two extreme right-wing parties have yet to break out of mere 
fringe politics. In the future their role will continue to be that of political pressure 
groups to the right of the RPCR. 
The "tentation ultra" 
From the electoral fringe politics of the extreme right, this section concentrates 
on the shadowy realm of clandestine loyalist activities in New Caledonia during the 
1980s. These activities have ranged from inflammatory pamphleteering and graffiti 
through to arson, bombings, threats and acts of physical violence against 
independantistes, the organisation of security guards and militias, arms trafficking, 
assassinations and paramilitary plans. In no way should it be thought that the people 
involved in these diverse activities are part of some greater extremist conspiracy or 
movement. These activities can not necessarily even be defined according to the party 
1 Connell p.348. 
2 Christnacht p.57. 
3 See Le Monde 5/4/88 p.18; 25/5/88 p.ll. 
4 Ibid. ll/4/87 p.6. 
5 Ibid. 29/6/88 p.9. 
6 Ibid. 5/4/88 p.18. 
* See above p.41. 
7 Le Monde 13/6/89 p.9. 
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political affiliations of the individuals involved. Links with parties, mainly the RPCR, 
will be discussed, but proving whether individuals involved in illegal acts were doing 
so "under orders" or on their own initiative is difficult. Due to this vagueness, the 
extremist organisers of clandestine loyalist activities will be collectively described as 
the tentation ultra , a necessarily vague term for a shadowy, mainly anonymous 
assortment of extremist individuals. I Owing to the covert nature of these activities, and 
the frequent mythomania and exaggerations of those involved with them, these 
clandestine activities have been prone to overemphasis. As a political force, extremist 
loyalist violence in New Caledonia has not halted Kanak independence claims in the 
1980s, although Connell believes it has slowed down the FLNKS's progress by 
creating feelings of helplessness and internal discord.2 
Mention of the broussards' background of armed political activity in the 1940s 
and 1950s has already been made, as has mention of their organisation of milices 
d'autodefense in isolated villages like Hienghene during the 1984-85 period.* Such 
rural militias were the first visible manifestation of an armed Caldoche reaction to the 
Melanesian independence movement. Marc Weitzmann describes the appearance of 
broussard militias in the late 1960s, formed as a reaction to the Foulards rouges. 3 Such 
militias have usually been organised informally by mutually-acquainted members of 
small rural communities. The militias were not of a permanent nature but were instead 
temporary responses to particular threats. Like Hienghene's 1984 militia, formed as a 
result of Machoro's occupation of Thio and a rise in local FLNKS militantism, they 
were usually informally disbanded once tensions declined.4 As a result of their 
impermanent and informal nature, little hard information is available detailing the 
numbers involved in these bush militias, or the rural communities they were active in. 
More overtly political tentation ultra groupings were not formed in New 
Caledonia until the end of the 1970s. The first of these was the MOP, formed by the 
pied-noir Henri Morini on 26 August 1979.5 In the polarised political atmosphere 
created in response to the Dijoud Plan, the group declared that it would keep law and 
order in the Territory should the French administration fail to do so. 6 Like later groups 
of this genre, no details have been disclosed concerning the MOP's membership levels 
or the origins of its members. The MOP's main claim to notoriety resulted when one of 
its members, an off-duty policeman, shot Theodore Daye, a young Melanesian, on 7 
January 1980. The policeman was returned to metropolitan France and sentenced to five 
year's imprisonment.? There is no reason to believe the incident was premeditated or 
anything other than an unplanned, violent confrontation. It has also been suggested that 
the policeman was drunk at the time. 8 The MOP did not claim responsibility and the 
incident did not show the group's concerns for peace and order in a favorable light. 
MOP's only other significant action occurred on 22 July 1982. Morini organised a 
group of around 60 of his followers, wearing masks and carrying clubs. The group 
entered the Territorial Assembly Chambers in the middle of a debate and demanded that 
members of the FI/ FNSC coalition resign. For his efforts Morini received a 45 day jail 
sentence and the personal congratulations of Roger Laroque.9t 
The MOP was not the only focus for extremist activity in New Caledonia in the 
early 1980s. New Hebrides' steps towards its declaration of independence in June 1980 
turned the attention of certain loyalists to New Caledonia's closest geographical 
1 See Le Monde 9/7/87 p.6. 
2 Connell pp.354, 368. 
* See above p.14. 
3 Marc Weitzmann: Nouvelle-Calooonie. Un siecle de balles perdues p.70. 
4 BIPA White File 25/11/84. 
5 AFIKHM: Contribution a l'histoire du pays kanak p.96. 
6 Connell pp.281-282. 
7 AFIKHM p.97; Connell p.282. 
8 AFIKHM p.97. 
9 Connell pp.300-301. 
t Morini was also involved with the formation of the PNC in January 1982. Cf. above p.44. 
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neighbour. It was felt that should the New Hebrides gain independence its example 
would serve as encouragement, and possibly as a support base, for the FI.l The Santo 
rebellion of 28 May 1980 was reported to have received material support from certain 
Caldoches. The gendarme assigned to investigate rumoured arms trafficking between 
New Caledonia and Santo, Brigade Commander Franz Cabale, was shot and killed in 
his Noumean appartment on 26 November 1980. His investigations were not resumed 
following his death.2 
Similarly, the identity of the murderer of Pierre Declercq, the Caldoche UC 
Secretary-General, has never been revealed. Declercq, killed on 19 September 1981, 
was the first politician to be murdered in New Caledonia, and his death marked the 
beginning of a level of political violence which spread further in the 1980s.3 Following 
Declercq's death, an anonymous Noumean group called Legitime defense distributed a 
pamphlet announcing a call to arms against the FI.4 No link between Legitime defense 
and Declercq's murder was ever established. It is probable that the pamphlet was merely 
an example of extremists seizing an opportune moment to proselytise. 
The November 1984-February 1986 period witnessed an escalation in the 
number of politically-motivated explosive and arson attacks against property: 28 
incidents took place, eight of which were against the property of independantiste 
leaders.5 In 1985, loyalist extremist groups also multiplied. The CCACF was formed in 
1985 by a group of pieds-noirs. Members of the group were arrested in June 1985 
when the police discovered a cache of bombs and ammunition. 6 Justin Guillemard 
formed his CAP in November 1985, described by him as a patriotic reservist formation. 
Roger Galliot of the FN(NC) set up the CACI, and the FCL marked their beginnings 
by blowing up Noumea's law courts and Lands Office.7 
None of the above groups were noted for their moderate views. In addition to 
being responsible for a chain letter which included a uhitu list of independantistes, s the 
FCL distributed a twenty page document to prominent loyalists in 1985. Its "Appel pour 
rorganisation d'un mouvement actif de resistance contre l'independance kanake 
socialiste" listed various methods of harrassing and intimidating FLNKS members and 
sympathisers, including hate mail, abusive phone calls, vandalism and theft of property, 
arson and bombing. The most extreme method recommended was euphemistically 
described as ''!'action totale (suppression de l'individu)u for which u la disparition totale 
sans trace (jeter le corps aux requins) u was the preferred method for disposing of any 
resultant corpses.9 
For all the FCL's diatribe, such methods have not been widely adopted by New 
Caledonian loyalists. Guiart points out that loyalists who do favour terrorism are 
predominantly II" ,ceux qui craquent a force de participer a des conversations de bar 0U 
l'on se gargarise de la description de la fa9on dont on demolira les canaques genants." 
Guiart concludes: 
On doit juger les europeens de Nouvelle-Caledonie sur leurs actions effectives et pas 
sur ce qu'ils disent, pour la simple raison que leurs declarations anti-canaques, surtout 
apres boice, sont facilement de l'ordre de l'insupportable, sans meme qu'ils en soient 
conscients.lO 
1 See Paitel for this thesis. 
2 Weitzmann pp.?0-71. 
3 Connell p.295. 
4 Weitzmann p.78; cf. Le Monde 19/2/85 p.l. 
5 Clark: Constitutional Dynamic, p.6; Le Monde 9/7/87 p.6. 
6 Connell p.353. 
7 Ibid. p.354. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Op. cit. Le Monde 9n/87 p.6. 
10 Guiart p.130, pp.252-253. 
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For Claude Sarran in February 1985, the reason why right-wing terrorism was 
not widespread in New Caledonia was the smallness of the Territory's population: "lei, 
tout le monde se connait et tout se sait. C'est pour cela que le terrorisme est faible pour 
!'instant. "1 According to Sarran it is difficult to conceal covert activities in such a small 
community. Guiart claims that the failure of Caldoche, metro and pied-noir right-wing 
activists to mobilise Noumean support has been because Noumea's inhabitants prefer to 
support French loyalism passively rather than through violent action. 2 Recent political 
developments support this claim. Following the RPCR's 1988 signature of the 
Matignon Accords, and despite extremist denunciations from the FN(NC) and FC, there 
has been no lasting resurgence of these political parties of the extreme right, and 
certainly no return of groups like CACI, FCL, or CAP. Mainstream loyalist support has 
instead been offered to the RPCR with its goals of peace and development alongside the 
FLNKS. At the end of the 1980s, the appeal to loyalists of violent extremist solutions is 
much less than it was in 1985. 
The RPCR's own flirtation with the methods of the extreme right in the mid-
1980s bears more political significance than small groups like the FCL. Amongst the 
RPCR's leaders then, Roger Laroque was not averse to the use of illegal force to 
support French loyalism. On 22 July 1982, he publicly thanked the approximately 
thirty3 young MOP members who burst in to the Territorial Assembly Chambers and 
shouted at FI and FNSC representatives present to resign.4 Laroque was also an 
advocate of armed militias until his death in 1985.5 Nor is Jacques Lafleur, the 
signatory to the 1988 Matignon Accords and the tamer of right-wing extremism, entirely 
without links to the tentation ultra. In May 1985 Lafleur, along with Laroque, joined in 
with a loyalist mob of several thousand who pursued 200 FLNKS demonstrators into 
the Vallee du Tir and surrounded the FLNKS offices there. One Kanak, Celestin 
Zanglo, was killed in the confrontation and others were injured. 6 Lafleur, whilst 
denying responsibility for organising any broussard militias in 1984, admitted that he 
did supply them with helicopter transport at his own personal expense: "Les milices, ce 
n'est pas moi. Ce sont des gens qui se sont organises spontanement pour se defendre. 
Moi, je me suis limite a leur fournir des moyens de transport. "7 
But the most important indicator of the RPCR's extremist tendencies in the mid-
1980s was its own "security force". In 1985, the RPCR appointed Henri Morini as its 
security head. He proceed to organise a private force for the RPCR, the security wing 
of which was comprised largely of Wallisians. The force's training grounds were in the 
Noumean suburb of Pont-des-Franyais.s Morini and his principal subordinates shortly 
fell out with the law. In June 1985 Morini was arrested for burgling the home of 
Maurice Lenormand, the former UC leader.9 Serge Vanhalle, appointed leader of the 
force's Noumean militia, was sentenced to two years imprisonment in 1985 for the 
possession of explosives,lO Bernard Deck's arrest in January 1986 however was the 
most revealing of all. Deck was Vanhalle's second-in-command and upon his arrest 
documents concerning a paramilitary operation were found. Included were three unit 
lists for an "Equipe choc", "Equipe no.1" and "Equipe no.2", a training programme, a 
1 Le Monde 19/2/85 p.l. 
2 Guiart p.299. 
3 Connell numbered the group at approximately sixty. See Connell pp.300-301. 
4 Weitzmann p.82. 
5 Connell p.368. 
6 Ibid. p.352. 
7 Le Point 19/12/88 pp.83,84. 
8 Connell p.353; Le Monde 9/7/87 p.6 
9 Connell p.354. 
10 Le Monde 9/7/86 p.6. 
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list of uniform requirements for the formation, and an assault plan of the cite 
Lenquettel with a "hit" list ofFLNKS supporters living there.2 
The RPCR maintained Morini as its security head into the period of the 
Matignon Accords despite these disclosures concerning his associates. The RPCR did 
not take active steps to dissassociate itself from these incidents. As mentioned earlier, 
Vanhalle was a beneficiary of ADRAF's generosity in 1987 following his release from 
prison.* Individuals like Morini arguably have less weight within the RPCR in 1989 
than they did in 1985, but their continued presence suggests that, contrary to his claims, 
Lafleur has not yet completely "ecarte les extremistes"t from his own ranks, if indeed 
he desires to do so. 
1 A Melanesian-inhabited housing estate on the edge ofNoumea. 
2 Le Monde 11/1/86 p.6. 
* See above p.36. 
t See above p.43. 
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Conclusion: on the nature of "Caldochie" 
This essay has offered an overview of the diverse social, ethnic and political 
groupings within the French loyalist community in New Caledonia. The centrality of the 
Caldoches to this broad community has been discussed along with their sense of 
identity. This conclusion will remark generally on the validity of ascribing to New 
Caledonian loyalists a distinct collective identity under the title "Caldochie". 
"Caldochie" is a useful term for describing the loyalist community within New 
Caledonia but it is necessary to inquire if the term does have real significance or whether 
it is merely a piece of facile metropolitan French journalese. Like the word "Kanaky" in 
the 1980s, in reaction to which it was coined, "Caldochie" is a hypothetical term. As a 
sovereign entity it has no status in French constitutional law. Nor is "Caldochie" widely 
accepted as a valid concept amongst New Caledonia's loyalists. Although loyalists are 
to be found predominantly in the Southern Province of the Grande Terre and to some 
extent can be delineated geographically from the independantiste-dominated Northern 
and Loyalty Islands Provinces, partition is not an option generally favoured by New 
Caledonian loyalists. Loyalists desire that New Caledonia as a whole remains within the 
French Republic. The PNC, with its 1982 concept of a Rhodesian-style independence 
for New Caledonia was merely a short-lived minority current of political opinion. 
The RPCR has not regarded a partition of New Caledonia along ethnic lines as a 
positive step. The party opposed Edgard Pisani's January 1985 proposal to deliver 
control of the Loyalty Islands and the interior of the Grande Terre to the FLNKS while 
leaving Noumea under Caldoche control with "free port" status.l If New Caledonia is to 
remain French following the 1998 self-determination referendum, it is the RPCR's wish 
that the Territory as a whole remain French. A future partition of New Caledonia into 
Kanaky and "Caldochie" is not an RPCR objective. The FLNKS may desire the 
creation of an independent Kanaky, but the RPCR does not uphold "Caldochie" as an 
entity deemed necessary to supercede New Caledonia as an administrative body. 
"Caldochie" is unlikely to exist as a sovereign entity and it should not be regarded as the 
expression of Caldoche loyalist aims in the same manner in which Kanaky represents 
independantiste objectives. As a political concept, "Caldochie" has no real currency in 
loyalist circles. 
Just as "Caldochie" does not adequately represent loyalist political goals, so too 
it fails to adequately represent New Caledonia's loyalists. Clearly derived from 
"Caldoche", the term "Caldochie" does not reflect the social and ethnic diversity of 
those who wish to retain links with France. As was mentioned in Chapter One, the 
Caldoches are just one segment of New Caledonia's loyalist population. Amongst New 
Caledonia's European inhabitants alone, there are also pieds-noirs and metros to be 
1 See Connell pp.338-339. 
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considered. Such is the size of the metro population in Noumea that it might equally be 
called "zozo-land" with some justification. Then there are New Caledonia's loyalist 
Melanesians, Wallisians, Futunans, French Polynesians and Asians to be considered. 
The collective label"Caldochie" hardly does these ethnic groups justice. 
The term "Caldochie" then has no real substance in either geographical, political 
or ethnic terms. It is a clever and sometimes convenient invention, but a superficial and 
misleading one somewhat out of tune with the era of the Matignon Accords. Jacques 
Lafleur has led the RPCR to realise that New Caledonia's loyalist majority cannot 
encourage peace and prosperity in the Territory as long as it ignores the demands of the 
FLNKS. * The loyalists cannot peacefully exist isolated from those demands. Mutual 
recognition by both loyalists and independantistes has hopefully established conditions 
under which both of these groups will be able to interact peacefully to determine New 
Caledonia's future. "Caldochie" cannot exist in isolation. Rather it is becoming part of 
a wider New Caledonian community. 
* See above p.38. 
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